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INTRODUCTION
When, if ever, may a pregnant woman be compelled to un-
dergo a cesarean section' to save the life of a viable, verge-of-
birth fetus? 2 Courts and scholars have increasingly addressed
1. Throughout this piece I discuss cesarean sections necessary to prevent
death or serious harm to the viable fetus. Thus, I am not at all suggesting that
as many, or more, cesarean surgeries be performed as at present. I am of
course aware of the controversy over the number of unnecessary cesarean sec-
tions performed in this country. See, e.g., MORTIMER ROSEN & LILLIAN
THOMAS, THE CESAREAN MYTH: CHOOSING THE BEST WAY To HAvE YouR
BABY (1989). For a host of reasons, including legal defensiveness, an excessive
commitment to technological solutions, the seeking of higher profits by physi-
cians and hospitals, and misunderstandings about the true need for cesarean
sections, there are many unnecessary cesarean procedures performed in this
country. Twenty-seven percent of births are performed by cesarean, more
than in almost any other country. Jane E. Brody, Personal Health, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 1989, at B5. Since cesarean surgeries present greater risks than
vaginal deliveries and require a period of recuperation, the number of these
operations should be reduced.
2. The leading works discussing this issue include: George J. Annas,
Forced Cesareans, The Most Unkindest Cut of All, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
June 1982, at 16 [hereinafter Annas, The Most Unkindest Cut]; George J. An-
nas, Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1213
(1987); Thomas E. Elkins et al., Court-Ordered Cesarean Section" An Analysis
of Ethical Concerns in Compelling Cases, 161 AM. J. OBSTETRIcS & GYNECOL-
OGY 150 (1989); H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Current Controversies in Obstet-
rics: Wrongful Life and Forced Fetal Surgical Procedures, 151 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 313 (1985); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions &
Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 9
[Vol. 76:239
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the constitutional and ethical problems presented when a wo-
man about to give birth requires a cesarean section to prevent
the death of or severe harm to her fetus, and the woman re-
fuses to have the surgery. Nationally, over a five year period,
courts have heard twenty-one cases in which a court-ordered
cesarean was being sought.3 Under what circumstances, if any,
is it legally and ethically appropriate to compel a woman to un-
dergo such surgery in order to save the life or essential health
of the fetus, and perhaps the mother's own life as well?
There are three basic obstetrical scenarios: first, where the
cesarean is essential for the life or health of the mother and the
fetus; second, where the cesarean is only minimally risky to the
life or health of the mother but is necessary to save the life or
health of the fetus; and third, where the cesarean would sub-
stantially jeopardize the health of the mother, but is necessary
to protect the life or health of the fetus.
The solutions this Article proposes are based, in part, on
certain qualities of the mother's decision, as well as the net gain
or loss in terms of human life. The solutions also take into ac-
count the mother's bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and
privacy rights.
In the first scenario, where the life of the mother and the
fetus are both in jeopardy absent a cesarean, and a cesarean
substantially reduces the risks to both parties, this Article pro-
poses that the surgery be performed despite the mother's com-
petent, authentic, voluntary, and informed refusal. In the
second scenario, where the fetus would die without a cesarean,
but a cesarean would present only the usual risks to the
mother, her refusal must be honored unless there is strong evi-
dence that she is incompetent, acting involuntarily, or asserting
(1987); Ronna Jurow & Richard H. Paul, Cesarean Delivery for Fetal Distress
Without Maternal Consent, 63 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 596 (1984); Patricia
King, Should Mom be Constrained in the Best Interests of the Fetus?, 13 NOVA
L. REV. 393 (1989); Veronika E. B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical In-
terventions, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987); J.R. Lieberman et al., The Fe-
tal Right to Live, 53 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 515 (1979); Mary Mahowald,
Beyond Abortion: Refusal of Cesarean Section, 3 BIoETHmcs 106 (1989); Law-
rence J. Nelson & Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women: Life, Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 JAMA 1060 (1988); Lawrence
J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: "Compelling
Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest," 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1986); Nancy K.
Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered
Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1951 (1986).
3. See William J. Curran, Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections Receive Judi-
cial Defeat, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 489, 489-90 (1990).
1991]
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a decision manifestly contrary to her authentic position. Fi-
nally, in the third scenario, where a cesarean would jeopardize
a mother's life or health, the court should respect her decision
to forego the surgery.
Commentators have focused on the comparative rights and
interests of the mother and the fetus, frequently concluding
that the maternal interest in bodily integrity, autonomy, and
privacy trumps any right a fetus, or a state acting on behalf of a
fetus, might have to compel a woman to undergo major surgery.
Commentators have paid scant attention to the situation where
both the mother and the fetus would probably die or be se-
verely harmed absent a cesarean, or to the question of the au-
thenticity of a woman's refusal to submit to cesarean surgery.
Recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals con-
sidered the legality of nonconsensual cesarean section in In re
A.C.4 Commentators have greeted the A.C. decision as a lauda-
ble recognition of a person's right to refuse treatment 5 and to
be immune from nonconsensual invasive medical procedures.
Even before A.C., many scholars had expressed similar views.6
4. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), vacating In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611
(D.C. 1987).
5. The decision was met with substantial approval by writers, scholars,
and spokespersons for various interest groups in the field. See, e.g., George J.
Annas, Foreclosing the Use of Force: A.C. Reversed, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
July-Aug. 1990, at 27; Curran, supra note 3, at 490; Barton Gellman, Mother's
Right Upheld Over Fetus's: D.C. Court Rules in Case of Cesarean Section for
Dying Woman, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1990, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, Court in
Capital Bars Forced Surgery to Save Fetus, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, § A, at 1.
The earlier decision in A.C, 533 A.2d at 611, also produced journalistic re-
actions. See Catherine Foster, Door Swings Open for More Legal Interven-
tions, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Oct. 10, 1989, at 8; Ellen Goodman, A Future
Without Roe May Also Put Fetus at Risk, NEWSDAY, May 2, 1989, (City Edi-
tion), at 60; Marney Rich, A Question of Rights: Birth and Death Decisions
Put Women in the Middle of Legal Conflict, CHI. TRm., Sept. 18, 1988, § 6, at 1;
Sandy Rovner, Agonizing Dilemmas, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1989, (Health), at
19; Rorie Sherman, Forced Cesarean: A Pyrrhic Victory, a Court Battle, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 3.
Probably the two leading articles written on behalf of the mother's right
to refuse a cesarean are those by Rhoden (legal perspective) and Nelson and
Milliken (medical perspective). See Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1952-54 ("1In no
other situation are rescues that risk life and limb mandated by law."); Nelson
& Milliken, supra note 2, at 1060 (discussing patient autonomy and the distinc-
tion between fetus and born child); see also Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 703.
A distinguished scholar who finds a maternal duty to submit to a cesarean
section is Professor John A. Robertson. See John A. Robertson, The Right to
Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 259 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 357-78 (1982);
see also Deborah Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm Limits
of State Intervention in Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 19 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Annas, The Most Unkindest Cut, supra note 2, at 16;
[Vol. 76:239
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This Article argues that the issue of whether to compel a
cesarean section is much closer than the A.C. court recognized.
There is a case to be made for protecting the values of bodily
integrity and autonomy in these situations. There is, however,
a much stronger case than courts and commentators have ac-
knowledged for requiring submission to cesarean surgery under
certain circumstances.
Part I of this Article discusses the developing law in the
area of compelled cesarean sections. Part II presents an argu-
ment for compelled cesarean sections in general, as far as the
law, logic, and medicine reasonably take it, and Part III dis-
cusses the countervailing arguments for the right to refuse an
unwanted cesarean section. Part IV describes the medical con-
ditions for which cesareans are indicated, and discusses associ-
ated surgical mortality and morbidity risks. Finally, Part V
presents the Article's main thesis and details the factors which
are, or should be, met before maternal autonomy may be over-
come. Part VI concludes by stressing the need for dialogue be-
tween doctor and patient.
I. COMPELLING CESAREANS: CONFLICTING
LEGAL AUTHORITIES
A. THEA.C. CASE
In the A.C. case,7 a twenty-seven year old woman who had
suffered from bone cancer for fourteen years became pregnant
with her first child. During her twenty-fifth week of preg-
nancy her condition became terminal. Told by doctors that her
life might be extended to the twenty-eighth week and that the
baby could be delivered by cesarean section, the woman, who
was heavily sedated and barely able to communicate her views,
gave inconclusive responses about her willingness to undergo
the surgery.8 A neonatologist, in a hearing at the hospital, of-
fered the opinion that the woman's fetus had a fifty percent to
sixty percent chance of survival if delivered immediately.9 An-
other physician testified that further delay would reduce the fe-
tus's chances of survival.10
Mahowald, supra note 2, at 111-12; Nelson & Milliken, supra note 2, at 1060;
Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 703; Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1951.
7. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), vacating In re A.C.,
533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987).
8. Id- at 1239.
9. I&
10. Id-
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The judge, finding that the mother's wishes could not be
ascertained, ordered doctors to perform a cesarean." The D.C.
Court of Appeals denied a stay.12 The baby died two-and-one-
half hours after its birth; the mother died two days later.13
Thereafter, the full court of appeals, sitting en banc, heard
the case despite its mootness. The court held that "in virtually
all cases the question of what is to be done is to be decided by
the patient-the pregnant woman-on behalf of herself and the
fetus. 1 4 If a woman is incompetent, the court continued, her
views on the matter should be ascertained by the substituted
judgment process.15 The substituted judgment process explores
the woman's statements, preferences, and values to determine
what her expressed wishes would have been were she suffi-
ciently competent or conscious to declare them.16
The court concluded that a medical procedure could not be
performed on a conscious, competent person without that per-
son's informed consent, that one person could not be required
to submit to bodily intrusion for the benefit of another's
health,1 7 and that a fetus cannot have rights "superior to those
of a person who has already been born."18 According to the
court, "the right to accept or forego medical treatment is of
constitutional magnitude."' 9 The court also stated that a risk of
coerced surgery would drive women with high-risk pregnancies
out of the health care system and that judicial proceedings in
these kinds of cases involve insufficiently protective procedural
standards, inadequate information, and inadequate preparation
time for any counsel appointed for the patient.20
. The court left an indeterminate, but small, opening for
11. Id at 1240 (describing trial court opinion).
12. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987).
13. 573 A.2d at 1238. Although the birth certificate listed the cesarean as
a contributing cause of the death, there is some controversy over that question.
See Barbara Mishkin, But She's Not an "Inanimate Container... ", HASTINGS
CENTER REP., June-July 1988, at 40, 41.
14. 573 A.2d at 1237.
15. Id at 1249.
16. The court should hear from the patient, family, friends, and health-
care professionals. It should look for evidence of previously expressed wishes
of the patient and "previous decisions of the patient concerning medical treat-
ment, especially when there may be a discernibly consistent pattern of conduct
or of thought" regarding the patient's values or goals. Id. at 1247, 1249-50.
17. Id. at 1243-44.
18. Id at 1244.
19. Id-
20. Id. at 1248.
[Vol. 76:239
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"overriding the patient's wishes."'' In the court's words, "we
do not quite foreclose the possibility that a conflicting state in-
terest may be so compelling that the patient's wishes must
yield, ... but we anticipate that such cases will be extremely
rare and truly exceptional." 22 Significantly, in a footnote, the
A.C court seemed to resuscitate the case for compulsion by re-
fusing to disapprove of an earlier District of Columbia case that
ordered a cesarean against the mother's will where it was nec-
essary to protect the health of both the mother and the full
term fetus.2
s
B. THE JEFFERSON CASE
In the only other appellate opinion addressing this ques-
tion, the Georgia Supreme Court took a view contrary to the
subsequent A. C. court's stance.24 In Jefferson v. Grffin Spald-
ing County Hospital Authority, the physicians concluded that
the mother, in her thirty-ninth week of pregnancy (the last
21. Id- at 1252.
22. Id- The A. opinion is strewn with footnotes that seem more or less
at odds with the broad language of most of the opinion. See Annas, supra note
5, at 27-29 (discussing inconsistencies in the footnotes). The court also men-
tioned several factors as bearing on whether to compel a cesarean, thus imply-
ing that compulsion might be justified under certain circumstances. The court
said, for example, that it is also proper for the trial court, in an appropriate
case, "to weigh (along with all the other factors) the mother's prognosis, the
viability of the fetus, the probable result of treatment or non-treatment for
both mother and fetus, and the mother's likely interest in avoiding impair-
ment for her child together with her own instincts for survival." 573 A.2d at
1251.
23. Comparing the AC. case to its own unreported decision in In re
Madyun, the court stated:
In particular, we stress that nothing in this opinion should be
read as either approving or disapproving the holding in In re Madyun.
There are substantial factual differences between Madyun and the
present case. In this case, for instance, the medical interests of the
mother and the fetus were in sharp conflict; what was good for one
would have been harmful to the other. In Madyun, however, there
was no real conflict between the interests of mother and fetus; on the
contrary, there was strong evidence that the proposed caesarean
would be beneficial to both. Moreover, in Madyun the pregnancy was
at full term, and Mrs. Madyun had been in labor for two and a half
days; in this case, however, A.C. was barely two-thirds of the way
through her pregnancy, and there were no signs of labor. If another
Madyun-type case ever comes before this court, its result may well
depend on facts that we cannot now foresee. For that reason (among
others), we defer until another day any discussion of whether
Madyun was rightly or wrongly decided.
573 A.2d at 1252 n.23 (citation omitted).
24. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga.
1981) (per curiam).
1991]
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week of normal pregnancy) was experiencing complete pla-
centa previa.25 Consequently, the doctors stated they were
ninety-nine percent certain that the fetus could not survive
vaginal childbirth, and that the chances of the mother surviving
such a birth were "no better than 50%. ' '26 The physicians be-
lieved that a cesarean would provide almost a one hundred per-
cent chance of saving both the mother and the fetus.2 The
mother, however, refused to submit to cesarean surgery be-
cause of her religious opposition to receiving a blood transfu-
sion and because she did not believe that she needed surgical
removal of the fetus.
28
The trial court ordered the mother to submit to a so-
nogram, to be followed by a cesarean section if the placenta
previa still blocked vaginal childbirth.2 9 Finding that the fetus
was not receiving proper care, the trial court gave child protec-
tion agencies the authority to consent to surgical delivery.30
The court found that "the intrusion ... into the life of Jessie
Mae Jefferson and her husband... is outweighed by the duty
of the State to protect a living, unborn human being from meet-
ing his or her death before being given the opportunity to
live."
3 '
The Georgia Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, re-
fused to grant the parents' motion for a stay.32 Citing Roe v.
Wade,33 a concurring judge declared that "[t]he Supreme Court
has recognized that the state has an interest in protecting the
lives of unborn, viable children."3 4 A second concurrence, eval-
uating the mother's religious claims, found that the state had
no less restrictive alternative for carrying its compelling inter-
est in preserving the life of the viable fetus.35
25. For a description of this condition, see infra note 215.
26. 274 S.E.2d at 458.
27. Id. at 459.
28. The mother believed that "the Lord ha[d] healed her body and that
whatever happen[ed] to the child [would] be the Lord's will." Id
29. Id at 459-60 (quoting the trial court opinion).
30. Id. at 459 (quoting the trial court opinion).
31. Id at 460 (quoting the trial court opinion).
32. Id
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. 274 S.E.2d at 460 (Hill, Presiding J., concurring).
35. Id at 461 (Smith, J., concurring).
[Vol. 76:239
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II. MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICTS DURING LATE
STAGES OF PREGNANCY
A. THE LEGAL STATUS OF A VIABLE FETUS
Historically, a fetus became a person in the law when it
was born alive.36 As early as 1946, however, a court awarded
damages to a child for injuries it had sustained as a fetus.37 In
Bonbrest v. Kotz, a federal district court rejected the argument
that a fetus is only a "part" of its mother and therefore not en-
titled to an independent legal claim.38 Professor Patricia King
has observed that by 1967 every state had followed Bonbrest's
lead and permitted recovery for fetal injury if the fetus was
subsequently born alive.39 In one case, a child recovered from
its mother for injuries it suffered as a fetus.
40
The fetus has enjoyed juridical recognition for many years,
especially in property law.41 At common law, a fetus, from the
time of conception, could be named an heir to a decedent's es-
tate.4 The unborn child's property rights, however, vested
only upon live birth.43 Intestate succession statutes have recog-
nized the rights of posthumous children.4
In addition, courts have deemed a viable fetus to be a "per-
son" in the context of civil actions for personal injury.45 A few
36. See Patricia King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for
Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MIcH. L. REV. 1647, 1657-59 (1979).
37. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
38. I& at 140.
39. King, supra note 36, at 1660.
40. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870-71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (child
could recover for permanent discoloration of teeth due to mother's ingestion of
tetracycline during pregnancy). But see Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d
355 (Mll. 1988) (holding that infant, suffering from fetal injuries unintentionally
caused by mother in automobile accident, could not bring action against its
mother).
41. For example, an Ohio statute treats a child in gestation who is subse-
quently born alive as a life in being for purposes of the rule against perpetu-
ities. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(A) (Anderson 1990) (adopting the
common law rule against perpetuities).
42. See Tomlin v. Laws, 134 N.E. 24 (IlM. 1922).
43. Jeffrey Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient" Emerging Rights as a Person?,
9 Am. J.L. & MED. 1, 3 (1983).
Ohio law recognizes a posthumous child's intestate rights. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (Anderson 1990). Under the Uniform Parentage Act, the
personal representative of an unborn child may bring an action on behalf of
the infant to establish a father-child relationship. OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.04(c) (Anderson 1989).
44. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (Anderson 1990).
45. Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (D. Conn. 1982)
(holding that a viable fetus born alive is a "person" within the meaning of 42
1991]
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states have enacted statutes that make the culpable killing of a
fetus a form of homicide.4
That the culpably caused stillbirth of a viable fetus justifies
recovery for lost consortium or wrongful death in at least
thirty-three states47 indicates that the negligently caused death
of a viable fetus is not treated as the loss of a chattel or of an
organ of the mother, but as the loss of an independent person
with human qualities and human potential.48 Some courts cal-
culate damages for these losses as damages for the loss of a
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)); Peterson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 N.E.2d 194, 197
(Ohio 1964) (deeming a viable fetus a "person" within the meaning of the fam-
ily compensation clause of an insurance contract).
46. Most courts have not extended common law crimes, such as man-
slaughter or homicide, to the killing of a fetus. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior
Court, 470 P.2d 617, 624 (Cal. 1970) (en banc); State v. Green, 781 P.2d 678, 682
(Kan. 1989). But see Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571, 575-76
(Mass. 1989) (holding that a viable fetus is a "person" for the purposes of the
Massachusetts common law crime of murder); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467
N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984) (holding prospectively that a viable fetus is a
"person" for the purposes of a vehicular homicide statute); State v. Home, 319
S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (holding prospectively that it is a crime to murder a
viable fetus).
Several states have enacted statutes treating the killing of a fetus as a
form of homicide. See People v. Shum, 512 N.E.2d 1183, 1198 (Ill. 1987); Perigo
v. State, 541 N.E.2d 936 (Ind. 1989).
The common law held that one who fatally injures a fetus which is later
born alive and dies, has committed homicide. See State v. Cornelius, 448
N.W.2d 434, 437 & n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
47. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 721 n.5 (Ariz. 1985) (en
banc) (collecting cases). Evidently only nine states have explicitly rejected the
claim of a wrongful death action based on the culpably caused stillbirth of a
viable fetus. Id at 722 n.6. The Summerfield court observed that "[t]he ma-
jority [of courts] ... finds no logic in the premise that if the viable infant dies
immediately before birth it is not a 'person' but that if it dies immediately af-
ter birth it is a 'person.'" I&L at 722.
The following observation of the Ohio Supreme Court is also pertinent:
"Suppose, for example, viable unborn twins suffered simultane-
ously the same prenatal injury of which one died before and the other
after birth. Shall there be a cause of action for the death of one and
not for that of the other? Surely logic requires recognition of causes
of action for the deaths of both or for neither."
Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ohio 1985) (quoting Stidam v. Ash-
more, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959)); see also Chrisafogeorgis v.
Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ill. 1973); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1087
(Pa. 1985) (holding that wrongful death and survival statutes gave cause of ac-
tion for stillborn child). Regarding recovery for a stillborn fetus, see generally
Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Dam-
ages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978).
48. See, e.g., Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d
394, 397 (D.C. 1984); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 491 (N.C. 1987);
Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1093 (Zappala, J., concurring).
[Vol. 76:239
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child.49 Moreover, in states that have survivorship statutes, a
stillborn fetus may have a separate estate to which damages
may flow.s° Thus, the fetus is treated as if it were a born child
in many circumstances.5 '
Of course the fetus is not a "person" for purposes of consti-
tutional standing,52 but the cases strongly suggest that what
happens to a viable fetus is a legally cognizable concern. Be-
yond private litigation, the state has a compelling interest in
the potential life of the fetus at least from the time it is viable5 3
and, perhaps, even earlier.M In addition to the existing legally
cognizable interests, viable fetuses may enjoy some emerging
rights against the mother.
B. FETAL vERsus MATERNAL RIGHTS
Courts have heard about twenty-one cases where a court-
ordered cesarean section was being sought.55 In Jefferson, doc-
tors determined that the risk to both the fetus and the mother
would be significantly greater if delivery were vaginal than if
delivery occurred by cesarean section.56 The court sub-
ordinated the mother's autonomy and bodily integrity to the
welfare of the fetus.5
7
49. See, e.g., Williams, 482 A.2d at 398 ('Evidentiary problems of causa-
tion and pecuniary loss are not demonstrably more difficult when the dece-
dent is a viable fetus than when the decedent is a child or newborn infant.");
Werling, 476 N.E.2d at 1054; Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1088. Contra DiDonato, 358
S.E.2d at 493-94 (denying possibility of recovery of damages for lost income
and services on grounds that damages would be too speculative).
50. See, e.g., Williams, 482 A.2d at 397-98 (holding that cause of action in
favor of estate of fetus survives its stillbirth); Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1088 (same).
51. See, e.g., Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1088.
52. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
53. Id at 163-64.
54. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989).
55. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
56. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458
(Ga. 1981) (per curiam). Interestingly, in Jefferson the mother left the hospi-
tal and delivered vaginally; both mother and infant apparently turned out fine.
See Annas, The Most Unkindest Cut, supra note 2, at 16. While this fact is of
little significance by itself, it does cast some doubt on the accuracy of medical
assessments of the risk of vaginal deliveries.
57. But see Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983), in which the court
found that a woman could not be ordered to submit to an operation designed
to assure that her cervix would remain competent throughout her pregnancy.
Id at 397. The woman, a born-again Christian, based her refusal to have the
minor surgery on her religious beliefs. Id- at 396. Among other things, the
court pointed out that the fetus was not viable and that it had found no case
ordering submission "to a surgical procedure to assist in carrying a child not
then viable to term." Id- at 397 n.4. Moreover, there was no showing in this
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That numerous actions, both criminal 85 and otherwise, 59
have been brought, sometimes successfully, against mothers
who have injured or endangered their fetuses through drug or
alcohol use bespeaks at least the evolving mores of our age.
Courts have applied child neglect laws to take custody of chil-
dren from their mothers on the basis of prenatal conduct.60 In
one case, a court held a mother liable for the damages a new-
case of the likelihood that the pregnancy would be carried to term without the
surgical procedure. Id. at 397.
Although the court found that the woman's constitutional right to privacy
prevailed under the facts before it, it observed:
We do not decide whether, in some situations, there would be justifi-
cation for ordering a wife to submit to medical treatment in order to
assist in carrying a child to term. Perhaps the State's interest, in
some circumstances, might be sufficiently compelling. .. to justify
such a restriction on a person's constitutional right of privacy.
Id. Thus, had the fetus been viable and in jeopardy, the result may have been
different. But cf In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ohio) (upholding the right
of a patient to refuse to undergo surgery for cervical cancer for religious and
other reasons), cert denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
58. "[T]here have been about 35 cases, involving a wide range of novel
legal theories, in which women have faced criminal charges for using drugs or
alcohol while pregnant. In most the charges were ultimately dismissed or
dropped, sometimes before indictment." Tamar Lewin, Drug Use in Preg-
nancy: New Issue for the Courts, N.Y. TIMs, Feb. 5,1990, at A14.
59. More than 150 infants are taken from their addicted mothers each
month in the state of California alone. Catherine Foster, Fetal Endangerment
Cases Increase, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 10, 1989, at 8.
60. See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio Com. P1. 1986) (holding
that, because a mother's drug use created a substantial risk to the health of
her fetus, the child, who was born addicted to heroin, was an abused child).
In In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. App. 1980), the state petitioned to
take temporary custody of a child who exhibited signs of drug withdrawal 24
hours after birth. The court discussed whether a mother's prenatal behavior is
relevant in determining if a newly-born child has been neglected. It concluded
that since a child "has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body
... it is within [the] best interest [of the child] to examine all prenatal conduct
bearing on that right." Id at 739. The court held that a newborn suffering
withdrawal symptoms as a consequence of prenatal maternal drug addiction
was a neglected child for the purposes of probate court jurisdiction. Id.
In In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fain. Ct. 1985), the court determined
that a mother's alcohol abuse and her failure to seek proper medical care for
her unborn child were "sufficient to establish an 'imminent danger' of impair-
ment of physical condition, including the possibility of fetal alcohol syn-
drome." Id. at 334. Therefore, the court held that the child, who had been
born, was neglected. Id. It must be noted that the court relied on a legal pre-
sumption that the child of a person who repeatedly uses alcohol to the extent
of impairment of judgment is a neglected child. Id. The presumption may be
rebutted by enrollment in a recognized rehabilitative program. Id.
"The important state interests in preservation of life, the potentiality of
life, and child welfare lend resolute support to the argument that child abuse
and neglect statutes should include unborn children. In reality, this is the
[Vol. 76:239
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born suffered from a prescription drug the mother took during
pregnancy.
6 1
Courts have also ordered pregnant women to undergo
blood transfusions against their religious beliefs for the sake of
a fetus.62 In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Hospital v. Ander-
son,6 3 the court decreed that, if necessary to save the life of a
pregnant Jehovah's Witness or the life of her fetus, the hospital
would be ordered to give the woman a blood transfusion against
her will and religious convictions.6 The pregnancy was beyond
the thirty-second week.
6 5
In In re Jamaica Hospital,6 6 a mother, eighteen weeks
pregnant and in critical condition, had refused a transfusion on
religious grounds.67 The court appointed a physician as the spe-
cial guardian of the unborn child and ordered the doctor "to ex-
ercise his discretion to do all that in his medical judgment was
necessary to save its life, including the transfusion of blood into
the mother."6 The transfusion was needed to stabilize the wo-
man and to protect the life of her midterm fetus.69 The court
said that the fetus could be regarded "as a human being, to
whom the court stands in parens patriae, and whom the court
has an obligation to protect." 70
In Crouse Irving Memorial Hospita4 Inc. v. Paddock,71 a
New York court ordered a transfusion, despite the mother's
religious objection, to save the mother and the fetus she was to
deliver prematurely.
72
These cases suggest that a viable fetus should be treated as
only way to give meaningful effect to those interests." John Myers, Abuse and
Neglect of the Unborn Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 29 (1984).
61. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
62. In other cases, courts have ordered blood transfusions for a parent in
order to protect living children from the loss of a parent. In re President of
Georgetown Col., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., in chambers),
cert denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Winthrop Univ. Hosp. v. Hess, 490 N.Y.S.2d
996, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1985). But cf Randolph v. City of New York, 501 N.Y.S.2d
837, 841 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that husband could not recover from doctors
for death of wife who refused transfusion, even though the couple had chil-
dren), aff'd as modified, 507 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1987).
63. 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.) (per curiam), cert denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
64. Id. at 538.
65. Id at 537.
66. 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
67. Id at 899.
68. Id. at 900.
69. Id- at 899.
70. Id. at 900.
71. 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
72. Id. at 443-44.
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 251 1991-1992
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
a child worthy of legal protection.7 3 In these cases the state has
impinged on the autonomy and bodily integrity of mothers, but
has done so to serve a traditional state value, the prevention of
harm to third parties.74
Courts have also ordered medical treatment of a sibling to
allow another sibling to live.7 5 In Strunk v. Strunk, the court
approved transplantation of a kidney from an incompetent
child to a sibling in order to save the recipient's life.76 It is not
clear whether parental consent was critical to the judicial au-
thorizations. One author finds that Strunk suggests "a rather
stringent duty to prevent or remove harm, or both, to a mem-
ber of one's immediate family, a duty that involves significant
risk to oneself and is shared even by members of the family
who are incompetent to shoulder other types of obligations." 77
C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FETAL VIABILITY
The Supreme Court's language in Roe v. Wade regarding
the juridical status of the viable (normally third trimester) fe-
tus cannot be ignored. In essence, the Court held that a third
trimester fetus, because it is presumptively viable, may consti-
73. See Watson A. Bowes & Brad Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights:
Medical and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209, 212-13
(1981) (arguing that a full term viable fetus clearly has rights deserving of
protection).
74. Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852-53
(1990) (recognizing state's interest in protecting health and welfare of
individuals).
75. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Strunk v.
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1969). But cf. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d
1319, 1343-45 (Ill. 1990) (holding that three-year-old twins could not be com-
pelled, against their mother's wishes, to be tested as potential donors of bone
marrow to their half-brother, who was dying of leukemia, where the twins had
almost no contact with the half-brother (who lived in a separate household)
and the" prospect of benefit to the patient was poor).
76. 445 S.W.2d at 148-49. Contra Lausier v. Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182
(Wis. 1975) (declining to follow Strunk and holding that it lacked the power to
permit the removal of a kidney from an incompetent child to save the life of
his brother, notwithstanding only slight risk of harm to the incompetent
sibling).
77. Mathieu, supra note 5, at 43-44. Mathieu states that in Strunk the
costs to the donor were not given much weight and that the "consensus among
informed and competent people was that the donation should be made, even
though the donor could not understand what was being asked of him," and
that the court would allow an incompetent person to donate a kidney to a sib-
ling. Id. at 43. Cf. James F. Childress, Analogical Reasoning: Organ/Tissue
Donation and Cesarean Sections, 2 BioLaw (University Publications of
America) Special Section, at S:443 (June, 1990) (discussing ethical considera-
tions in imposing a duty to provide an organ or undergo a cesarean).
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tutionally be protected by the state from all but therapeutic
abortions.78 It said that in the third trimester the state's com-
pelling interest may outweigh the mother's interest in an abor-
tion, unless an abortion is essential to the preservation of the
mother's health or life.79 Thus, a state's interest in the poten-
tial life of a viable fetus may prevail over a mother's procrea-
tional rights, absent a threat to the preservation of a mother's
health or life.80
Viability means that the fetus's condition is such that it can
survive after birth with help from neonatal intensive care re-
sources.8 1 According to the Supreme Court in Roe, "viability is
usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur
earlier, even at 24 weeks. '8 2 Since the 1973 decision, improve-
ments in health care have made survival more likely at a gesta-
tional age of between twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks.
8 3
Most women in their seventh month expect to be
mothers.84 With that expectancy comes the assumption of re-
sponsibilities. Moreover, tradition in child bearing strongly sug-
gests that the expectant mother has obligations to the fetus.
Moral-medical injunctions to the expectant mother regarding
prenatal care are not new or radical, except to the extent that
medicine has recently become aware of the importance of such
care to a healthy outcome for the eventual baby.8 5 A viable fe-
tus is in one sense a part of the mother, but in another sense a
charge of the mother, who protects it from the elements, shock,
trauma, excessive temperatures, and poisonous substances. As
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
79. "For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its inter-
est in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." Id at 164-65.
80. The question whether the risks from cesarean surgery bring this ex-
ception to bear will be explored in this Article. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that a nonconsensual cesarean section is mandated if an abortion is
prohibited.
81. Mahowald, supra note 2, at 110.
82. 410 U.S. at 160.
83. Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellees at 5, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (No. 88-605).
84. This Article takes no position, express or implied, on the question of
abortion of a previable fetus.
85. See Paul H. Wise et al., Infant Mortality Increase Despite High Access
to Tertiary Care: An Evolving Relationship Among Infant Mortality, Health
Care, and Socioeconomic Change, 81 PEDIATRICS 542, 546 ("Although the pre-
cise mechanisms of action require further delineation, the importance of pre-
natal care services to optimal birth outcome seems well established.").
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Professor Nancy K. Rhoden observed, "[t]he vast majority of
women will accept significant risk, pain, and inconvenience to
give their babies the best chance possible. One obstetrician who
performs innovative fetal surgery stated that most of the wo-
men he sees 'would cut off their heads to save their babies.' "86
Moreover, a mother holds the child, in part, for the equita-
ble benefit of the father. Although a father does not have a
right to prevent the mother from aborting a non-viable fetus,
the father has a strong interest in the emerging child,87
although it cannot take precedence over a woman's autonomy.
The paternal interest strengthens as the fetus nears term and
fatherhood is just at hand.
Although delivering a fetus at a point earlier than viability
would not be likely to produce a new member of the species for
a normal life span, delivering it after viability would have that
consequence. Under certain circumstances, the person most
threatening to the life of the fetus is the mother. It begs the
main question to assert that, while the state should be able to
enforce the interests of a fetus, it should not be able to do so
against the mother.88 If a viable8 9 fetus is a child-in-waiting,
i.e., a verge-of-birth fetus,9° then analogical inferences may be
drawn from the law governing parental obligations to children.
How does one go about answering the question whether
the fetus, particularly the verge-of-birth fetus, is a separate ju-
ridical being, in certain significant senses, from the woman who
carries it? Many physicians consider the viable fetus to be a
86. Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1959.
87. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976);
id at 93 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A father's in-
terest in having a child-perhaps his only child-may be unmatched by any
other interest in his life.").
88. Cf. Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts
with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protec-
tion, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986) (criticizing the development of fetal rights as un-
dermining women's reproductive rights).
89. The viability criterion "represents a societal commitment to bestowing
rights on those likely to contribute to its advancement. It naturally follows
the societal instinct for self-preservation." King, supra note 36, at 1677.
90. By verge-of-birth I am being only somewhat tautological. I do not
mean to suggest that cesareans are performed mostly on women at term, for
many cesareans are performed because it would be dangerous for the woman
and/or the fetus to go to term. These fetuses, although viable, are premature.
Nevertheless, in a study of court ordered cesareans, 13% were sought at 31 to
33 weeks gestation, 33% were sought at 34 to 36 weeks gestation, and the re-
mainder at or beyond term. None were borderline viability cases. See Kolder
et al., supra note 2, at 1193.
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second patient.9 ' One of the leading obstetrical textbooks
states in the preface to a recent edition:
Happily, we have entered an era in which the fetus can be rightfully
considered and treated as our second patient. In this edition, we have
sought to do just that. Fetal diagnosis and therapy have now emerged
as legitimate tools the obstetrician must possess.... We are of the
view that it is the most exciting of times to be an obstetrician. Who
would have dreamed-even a few years ago-that we could serve the
fetus as physician?92
A leading study of cesarean sections echoes that view:
In the case of cesarean delivery there are almost always at least two
patients involved-only one of which (the mother) may be able to
speak for herself Indeed this is the main feature that makes decision-
making in cesarean birth unique ethically. The other patient (fetus or
fetuses) will always require that someone else make the decision for
(him)(her)(them). Usually, but not necessarily, the mother will be as-
sumed to be the surrogate who has the fetus(es)' best interest at
heart
9 3
Indeed, a whole field of medicine, perinatal medicine, has
been developed to care for and treat the fetus.94 Professor
King observed that birth has traditionally been "the point at
which the fetus was entitled to full legal protection of its inter-
ests because birth was once synonymous with viability.... To-
day viability precedes birth, and... is preferable to birth [as
the point of entitlement] because... there is no relevant differ-
ence between a viable fetus and a newborn." 95 Professor King
concluded that "viable fetuses merit all protection currently
given the newborn infant."96
The state, in asserting the interests of a viable fetus, has at
least an arguable case for requiring maternal submission to a
cesarean under certain circumstances. Almost by definition,
when doctors consider a cesarean section, the fetus is beyond
the point of viability. The discussions about the significance of
viability, while relevant, ignore the actual stage of gestation in-
91. For an amusing and enlightening brief history of the treatment of fe-
tus as patient, see Michael R. Harrison, Unborn: Historical perspective of the
fetus as patient, PHAROS, Winter 1982, at 19. "Although he cannot make an ap-
pointment and seldom even complains, this patient will at times need a physi-
cian." I&i at 23-24.
92. JACK A. PRITCHARD & PAUL C. MACDONALD, WIIAms OBsTETRIcs
at vii (16th ed. 1980) (emphasis added).
93. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH AND HumAN DEVELOPMENT,
PuB. No. 82-2067, REPORT OF A CoNsENsus DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE ON
CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH 465 (1981) [hereinafter CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH].
94. See Lenow, supra note 43, at 15-17.
95. King, supra note 36, at 1663, 1676 (emphasis deleted).
96. Id at 1687.
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volved in typical decisions about whether to have a cesarean.9
A cesarean normally becomes an option only at the point where
the fetus, with the mother's cooperation, is about to be born
and begin its infancy;98 in other words, long after the point at
which the fetus merely had a chance of surviving outside the
womb. The fetus at the verge of birth may well deserve greater
state protection than the fetus who could merely survive
outside the womb. A verge-of-birth fetus is no different than a
newborn, except for the fact that it is still in utero.9 The
state's right to require life-saving, handicap-preventing treat-
ment is no less than the newborn's right to have such treat-
ment. The medical profession places no greater emphasis on
the health of a newborn than it does on the healthy birth of a
fetus.
D. DUTIES TO RESCUE: DOCTRINAL ANALOGIES
One of the first doctrines that most students of criminal
law learn is that parents have a duty to come to the aid of their
children in perilous situations. Although the cases are few and
far between, the authoritative declarations are unambiguous.
Thus, as noted criminal law experts Professors LaFave and
Scott explain in their treatise on criminal law:
The common law imposes affirmative duties upon persons standing in
certain personal relationships to other persons-upon parents to aid
their small children, upon husbands to aid their wives .... Thus a
parent may be guilty of criminal homicide for failure to call a doctor
for his sick child, a mother for failure to prevent the fatal beating of
her baby by her lover, a husband for failure to aid his imperiled wife,
a ship captain for failure to pick up a seaman or passenger fallen over-
board, and an employer for failure to aid his endangered employee.
Action may be required to thwart the threatened perils of nature,
(e.g., to combat sickness, to ward off starvation or the elements)
100
97. See supra note 90 (discussing points in gestation for court-ordered
cesareans).
98. See F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLiAMs OBsTETRIcs 441 (18th ed.
1986) (stating that a cesarean section is warranted whenever "further delay in
delivery would severely compromise the fetus, the mother, or both, yet vaginal
delivery is unlikely to be accomplished safely").
99. Nasciturus pro jam nato habetur: "Those who are about to be born
shall be considered already born." DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPAN-
ION TO LAW 133 (1980). Since temporal proximity to birth has always been one
of the criteria used to determine the status of a fetus, it is not question-begging
to point out that fetuses involved in the cesarean birth controversy, being as
close to birth as possible, arguably deserve the greatest protection.
100. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 203-04 (2d ed.
1986) (citing Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Palmer v.
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Parents may have a legal duty to rescue their drowning
children.10 1 States may require parents to save their child by
obtaining medical attention for the child even if their religion
counsels otherwise. 0 2 Parents may be required to rescue or ob-
tain help for their child when someone is assaulting the
child. 03 The more problematic query is determining what risks
parents must take to protect their children from harm.
Although the actual cases have not yet involved the breadth of
the situations set down by the leading commentators, the cases
have prescribed the same general bounds of parental duty.
A North Carolina case, State v. Walden,1°4 elaborates at
considerable length on the parental duty to rescue a child in
peril. Walden involved a parent's duty to rescue a child from
an assault. The court stated:
[We believe that to require a parent as a matter of law to take affirm-
ative action to prevent harm to his or her child or be held criminally
liable imposes a reasonable duty upon the parent. Further, we believe
this duty is and has always been inherent in the duty of parents to
provide for the safety and wvelfare of their children, which duty has
long been recognized by the common law and by statute. This is not
to say that parents have the legal duty to place themselves in danger
State, 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960); State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982);
Harrington v. State, 547 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)); see also RoL-
LiN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 658-72 (3d ed. 1982).
While general good samaritan laws are rare in this country, Wisconsin re-
cently imposed criminal liability on "[a]ny person who knows that a crime is
being committed and that a victim is exposed to bodily harm" but fails to sum-
mon help or provide assistance to the victim. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a)
(West 1989). Minnesota requires that "[a]ny person at the scene of an emer-
gency who knows that another is exposed to or has suffered grave physical
harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger or peril to
self or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person." MNN. STAT.
ANN. § 604.05. Subd. 1 (West 1988); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a)
(1973) (providing that "[a] person who knows that another is exposed to grave
physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without dan-
ger or peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to
others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance
or care is being provided by others").
101. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 100, at 204 n.15 (citing Rex v. Rus-
sell, [1933] V.R. 59 (while wife drowned the small children, father stood by
without attempting to rescue them and was held guilty of manslaughter)).
102. See In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1389 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
103. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 100, at 204 & n.15; see also State v.
Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 782 (N.C. 1982) (mother may be found guilty of assault
on aiding and abetting theory because she was present while her child was as-
saulted and she failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the assault); State v.
Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986) (parent who knew her spouse had re-
peatedly abused her children, and who took no action to stop the abuse, could
be tried for child abuse).
104. 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982).
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of death or great bodily harm in coming to the aid of their children.
To require such would require every parent to exhibit courage and
heroism which, although commendable in the extreme, cannot realis-
tically be expected or required of all people. But parents do have the
duty to take every step reasonably possible under the circumstances
of a given situation to prevent harm to their children.
In some cases, depending upon the size and vitality of the parties
involved, it might be reasonable to expect a parent to physically inter-
vene and restrain the person attempting to injure the child.105
The parent-child relationship is not the only source of a
pregnant woman's duty to rescue her viable, verge-of-birth fe-
tus from potential death. The law of mandatory rescue also
holds that: one who causes a person to be in peril has a duty to
rescue that person, 10 6 and one who, by beginning to care for or
rescue a person, makes rescue by others impossible or unlikely,
has a duty to complete the rescue.10 7 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts imposes a duty on one "who voluntarily takes the cus-
tody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the
other of his normal opportunities for protection."'0 8  Thus,
there is a duty to rescue one's child from peril, a duty to rescue
a person whom one has innocently or culpably'0 9 placed in
peril, and a duty to rescue another whose care one has volunta-
rily assumed and, in so doing, prevented others from rendering
105. Id at 786 (citations omitted). This Article contends that the degree of
risk of given levels of danger, rather than the mere existence of any danger,
should be the controlling factor. To expect mothers at or very near term to
undergo cesareans when only the normal and usual risks are involved is
hardly to call for an act of courage or heroism.
Parents are obligated in accordance with their means to support and
maintain their children-i.e., to furnish adequate food, clothing, shel-
ter, medical attention and education. A parent's failure to observe
minimum standards of care in performing these duties entails both re-
medial sanctions, such as the forfeiture of custody, and criminal sanc-
tions. Parents are also obligated to provide proper guidance and
guardianship of their children and are vulnerable to legal sanction for
failure to meet minimum standards of care, for example, by the exces-
sive infliction of corporal punishment, by the excessive use of drugs or
alcohol, or by directing or authorizing a child under 16 to engage in an
occupation involving substantial risk of danger to his life or health.
Parents are also obligated to supervise their children.
Holedook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 342-43 (N.Y. 1974).
106. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 100, at 206. If one has culpably
caused the predicament there is even a stronger case for a duty to rescue.
107. Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962); LAFAVE &
Scorr, supra note 100, at 205-06.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 314(A) (1965).
109. There may be a legal difference, however, between culpably placing
another in a position of danger, and innocently creating the danger. Cf
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 100, at 206.
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aid.1 10 The law imposes, in addition, a duty not to prevent
others from rendering aid whether or not one has caused the
predicament.
Several bases support an obligation to rescue, as well as a
duty to allow others to rescue, in the case of a pregnant woman
whose fetus is at or beyond the point of viability. She is the
mother of the being. She is responsible for placing the being's
life in jeopardy by conceiving it 1 and perhaps also by allowing
it to reach this stage without aborting it as a previable fetus.
1-12
She has enabled it to reach the stage at which it is doomed un-
less she delivers it.
113
Once the time for a lawful abortion has passed, the mother
implicitly undertakes to take care of her fetus and bring it to
life in as healthy a condition as she can without shouldering an
unreasonable burden. Although such an undertaking cannot be
said to be a contractual undertaking, as there is no agreement
and no consideration, the imposition of quasi-contractual du-
ties-contractual duties by virtue of public policy-seems rea-
sonable. One who assumes a duty by contract, such as a fire-
fighter or bomb-squad member, may be required to take a
higher risk than one who has a duty by virtue of relationship
only. So it might be argued that the mother has agreed to take,
not whatever risks are reasonable in the abstract, but whatever
risks are reasonable to bring about the birth of a healthy child.
Courts may interpret the term "reasonable" in this sense as the
normal risk that the one million women who voluntarily agree
to undergo cesarean sections undertake each year.1 1 4
110. Jones, 308 F.2d at 310; see LAFAVE & SCorr, supra note 100, at 205-06.
There are also statutory and contractually undertaken duties to rescue.
111. She would be responsible (certainly not "culpable") for conceiving it
unless she was the victim of rape, incest, failed contraception, or deception as
to the use of a condom by her partner.
112. Eike-Henner W. Kluge, When Caesarian Section Operations Imposed
by a Court are Justified, 14 J. MED. Emics 206, 209-10 (1988).
113. Compare this argument with that made in Rhoden, supra note 2, at
1975-82, which also presented the rescue theory. Rhoden raises and rejects the
analogy of rescue doctrine on the grounds that the strength of an obligation to
rescue does not affect the degree of risk the rescuer is obliged to undertake.
Id. I respectfully take issue with that conclusion, particularly in light of the
fact that the traditional analysis of duty to others in our legal system is in
terms of criminal penalties for failure to comply with one's legal duty. The
analysis and proposal involved herein do not contemplate criminal penalties,
except as a possible sanction for contempt of court. Furthermore, in the only
situation in which this Article's proposal unequivocally requires a cesarean,
there is a benefit, not a risk, to the mother from such surgery. See infra part
V.
114. Joel J. Alpert, Primary Care: The Future for Pediatric Education, 86
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Commentators have asserted by way of analogy, however,
that a person has no duty to compromise her bodily integrity by
donating an organ or tissue to another, even if such donation is
necessary to save the life of the other. The court in In re
A.C.115 discussed at length a Pennsylvania trial court opinion,
McFall v. Shimp,116 in which the court refused to compel the
cousin of a terminally ill patient to undergo additional testing
for tissue compatibility and to "donate" bone marrow for trans-
plantation if sufficiently compatible. This procedure, involving
only a slight risk of harm to the donor, could have offered the
donee a real hope of survival. The court did not require the
cousin to render assistance, stating that the proposed order
"would change every concept and principle upon which our so-
ciety is founded."'117 In expressing concern about the possible
effects of establishing a duty to undergo invasion of one's body
for the benefit of another, the Shimp court said that such a
duty "would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would
impose a rule which would know no limits, and one could not
imagine where the line would be drawn."
u 18
Notwithstanding the hyperbolic language of Shimp, the
mother who refuses a cesarean is distinguishable from a cousin
who refuses a bone marrow transplant to save his dying rela-
tive. The mother's physiological processes would bring about
the death of the fetus if she did not permit a cesarean. In addi-
tion, the mother usually bears a responsibility for the creation
of the life within her. It is her son or daughter that is strug-
PEDIATRICS 653, 658 (1990); see Stephen A. Myers & Norbert Gleicher, Letter
to the Editor, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 200, 200 tbl. 1 (1990).
115. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), vacating In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611
(D.C. 1987).
116. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978); see also In re
George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (court refused to disclose to a 33-
year-old adoptee dying from leukemia his natural father's name, after the fa-
ther denied paternity and was unwilling to be tested for bone marrow compat-
ibility); Fordham E. Huffman, Comment, Coerced Donation of Body Tissue:
Can We Live With McFall v. Shimp?, 40 OHio ST. L.J. 409, 409 n.1 (1979).
117. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 92. In a rather melodramatic passage, the court
declared:
For a society which respects the right of one individual, to sink his
teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck
from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-
wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible extraction of living body
tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such would raise the
spectre [sic] of the swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the
horrors this portends.
1d.
118. Id. at 91.
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gling to be born, not a distant relative. As such, the causal con-
nection between the death of the fetus and the mother is much
closer than the connection between the death of the dying
cousin and the refusing cousin. Indeed, the physical connection
between fetus and mother, the physiological interdependence,
and the drawing of sustenance from the mother's blood stream,
suggest that nondelivery of the infant would be more akin to
terminating life support or failing to refill the feeding tube of a
comatose patient.119 Furthermore, in some situations, vaginal
delivery would threaten the life of the mother as well as the
fetus. Under those circumstances, and unlike the situation with
the donor of bodily organs, the mother's health is substantially
benefitted by a cesarean. °20
Another pertinent consideration not mentioned in the
literature on this subject is a virtually universal clause in living
will statutes: that the will provisions discussing cessation of
treatment do not apply if the patient is pregnant.~1  This im-
119. Professor Rhoden observed:
The Cesarean cases unquestionably feel different from cases or hy-
potheticals involving forced intrusions on parents to save children.
For one thing, the woman is going to give birth anyway, and if she
does it surgically instead of vaginally the baby will probably be
fine.... Moreover, it seems to some that women who choose not to
abort thereby assume certain obligations to their fetuses, a by no
means unreasonable suggestion. Generally, pregnancy is a unique sit-
uation. A dying relative, even a child, is a separate, independent
person.
Nancy K. Rhoden, Cesareans and Samaritans, 15 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE
118, 121-22 (1987).
Rhoden goes on to say, however, that what a court does when it compels a
cesarean is no different from what it does when it compels an organ donation.
Id. This writer disagrees with the premise that compelled donation of a kid-
ney from a parent to a child is legally impermissible, and agrees that even if it
were, the compelled cesarean is different in both "feel" and legal justification.
Philosopher Peter Singer posits that the moral duty of beneficence comes
into play "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, with-
out thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance." Peter
Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 229, 231
(1972).
On the other hand, philosopher Michael Sloate says that "one has an obli-
gation to prevent serious evil or harm when one can do so without seriously
interfering with one's life plans or style and without doing any wrongs of com-
mission." Michael Sloate, The Morality of Wealth, in WORLD HUNGER AND
MORAL OBLIGATION 125-27 (William Aiken & Hugh Lafollette eds., 1977).
120. See Frank A. Chervenak & Laurence B. McCullough, Justified Limits
on Refusing Intervention, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 15-16.
121. E.g., MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605 (1990); WYO. STAT. § 35-22-
102(b) (1987). To the same effect, see the Ohio Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Purposes, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(D) (Anderson 1990). A
Georgia statute states: "If I am female and I have been diagnosed as pregnant,
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plies that a pregnant woman has no right to refuse life-saving
treatment if the refusal will harm the fetus. Although the re-
strictions on living wills are meant to apply to life-extending
treatment, 122 life-extending treatment may be at least as intru-
sive as a cesarean. The reason the mother may not refuse
treatment is to assure the well-being of the fetus and birth of
the child before the mother dies.
Courts have also held that failure to provide medical atten-
tion to one's children constitutes neglect. 23 Even a good faith
religious objection will not override parents' obligations to pro-
vide for the medical needs of their children.124 In a recent Ohio
case, the court held that the parents' refusal to allow further
medical treatment of their sick child was sufficient to support a
finding that the child was a dependent child.125 The court
stated that the parents' religious faith did not permit them to
expose their child to progressive ill health and death.1
26
E. JUSTIFICATION
Under the law of justification, a person is entitled to injure
or kill an aggressor to save her own life. Some scholars argue
that self-defense is justified even against an "innocent" aggres-
sor who threatens the life of the subject.127 If a child has
this living will shall have no force and effect during the course of my preg-
nancy." GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3 (Michie 1989). An Idaho statute states: "If I
have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to any interested
person, the directive shall have no force during the course of my pregnancy."
IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (1989).
122. Certain situations calling for cesarean sections do further the health
and life interests of the mother; with respect to these, the analogy to living
wills legislation is even closer.
123. See O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
appointment of a temporary conservator for a 16-year-old Jehovah's Witness
who, along with his parents, refused a blood transfusion, was not an abuse of
discretion); cf. Mercy Hospital v. Jackson, 489 A.2d 1130 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1984) (mother could not be compelled to have a cesarean requiring a blood
transfusion when it was not necessary for the well-being of the fetus; the court
implied that a contrary ruling would have been issued if the fetus's well-being
was at stake), vacated as moot, 510 A.2d 562 (Md. 1986). But see In re Green,
307 A.2d 279, 280 (Pa. 1973) (holding that a mature, competent, 17-year-old Je-
hovah's Witness, who did not desire elective surgery and whose mother re-
fused to consent to blood transfusions which would be required for the
surgery, was not a "neglected child" within the meaning of the law), enforcing
In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972).
124. See O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 840.
125. In re Willman, 493 N.E.2d 1380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
126. Id. at 1382.
127. R. Kent Greenawalt, Violence: Legal Justification and Moral Ap-
praisal, 32 EMORY L. J. 437, 463-64 nn. 52-53.
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picked up a gun and is shooting wildly, if an insane person is
swinging a club, or if a person having an epileptic seizure is
strangling another, the victim may use whatever force is neces-
sary to extricate herself from the situation.128 Under prevailing
law, a third party may intervene and use force to the same ex-
tent as the victim.12 9 In the cesarean scenario, the fetus is the
subject-victim, and the mother refusing a cesarean is threaten-
ing the life of the fetus. In this scenario, the state, acting on
behalf of the fetus, should have the right to use reasonable
force, by compelling a cesarean, to avoid the application of
deadly force against the fetus.
The relationship between a verge-of-birth fetus and a
mother refusing a cesarean may also be analyzed in terms of
the tort of false imprisonment. The tort of false imprisonment
involves constraint of a person. 3 0 The tort occurs whether or
not the person is conscious of the constraint or harmed by it,
whether or not the constraint was committed where the con-
finement took place, and whether or not the means of escape
were unknown or unreasonably dangerous to the person. The
tort is committed whether the tortfeasor imposed physical bar-
riers or failed to provide a means of egress. The legal duty to
furnish a means of escape is imposed where there is a special
relationship between the parties. Thus, a mother, having cre-
ated a special duty toward her fetus by declining to have a first
or second trimester abortion, could conceivably be liable for
falsely imprisoning her fetus by refusing to release it through a
cesarean.
F. CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE INFRINGEMENTS OF
BODILY INTEGRITY
In Winston v. Lee,13 ' the Supreme Court held that a state
could not compel a shooting suspect to undergo surgery, requir-
ing a general anesthetic, to remove a bullet embedded in his
body. The Court found that because the state had other evi-
128. See Judith Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, The Lindley Lecture,
University of Kansas (Apr. 5, 1976), printed in part in JOHN KAPLAN & ROB-
ERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 841-43 (1986) (discuss-
ing the right to kill deadly, but innocent, aggressors). The mother may or may
not be innocent regarding the fetus's predicament, depending on the circum-
stances of conception.
129. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
130. FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 285-92 (2d ed. 1986).
131. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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dence of the suspect's involvement in the crime, and because of
the risks that this particular surgery entailed, including those
associated with general anesthesia, the state could not subject
the suspect to the operation.132 Although the Court was not
very receptive to the idea of compulsory surgery, it did not pre-
clude compulsory surgery under all conditions and in all situa-
tions. Indeed, the Court established the following test:
The Fourth Amendment neither forbids nor permits all such intru-
sions; rather, the Amendment's "proper function is to constrain, not
against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not jus-
tified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper man-
ner." The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin
depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests
in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in con-
ducting the procedure. In a given case, the question whether the com-
munity's need for evidence outweighs the substantial privacy interests
at stake is a delicate one admitting of few categorical answers.
133
The Court found that the state had substantial evidence of the
crime without the bullet.134 Thus, the Court's opinion did not
address the question at hand: Is the state prohibited from com-
pelling surgery as the only means to save the life of a verge-of-
birth fetus, given that such surgery is voluntarily entered into
by nearly a million women per year,135 and involves little more
than minimal risk of death or serious complications? 136
Winston did, however, make one thing clear: Compulsory
surgery is not per se forbidden; it is instead an invasion of per-
sonal interests that must never be performed without substan-
tial justification and an analysis of all relevant factors. 37
In a sense, the Winston balancing test merely codifies the
considerations courts have weighed when facing similar ques-
tions. For example, the nation may compel military service. 3 8
In order to prevent contagion to third parties, a person may be
132. Id. at 764-66.
133. HdL at 760 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966)).
Applying the test to Winston, the Court said that the proposed surgery was too
dangerous given the state's interests. While not defining exactly what it
meant by too dangerous, it did point out that the operation required "'exten-
sive probing and retracting of the muscle tissue', carrying with it 'the concomi-
tant risks of injury to the muscle as well as injury to the nerves, blood vessels
and other tissue in the chest and pleural cavity."' I& at 764 (quoting Lee v.
Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir. 1983)).
134. Id at 765.
135. In 1988, 967,000 cesareans were performed in the United States. My-
ers & Gleicher, supra note 114, at 200 tbl. 1.
136. For a discussion of risks, see infra part IV.B.
137. Winston, 470 U.S. at 760.
138. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
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quarantined,139 treated against his or her will, 14° or compelled
to submit to vaccination. 41 A state may compel a person to
submit to the taking of blood samples14 or urine samples 43 to
enforce laws against driving while intoxicated,1 " or to deter-
mine, for safety purposes, any recent use of drugs or alcohol.
145
The state may conduct strip searches 14 or body cavity
searches 47 (both visual and digital probes) at the nation's bor-
ders to keep out illegal substances, 148 and in jails or prisons to
keep lock-ups free from weapons or contraband. 4 9 Courts have
placed substantial limits on the liberty rights of a person with
active tuberculosis. Courts have also required subjects to be
treated with powerful drugs against their wills in order to pre-
vent infliction of violence on third parties.150 In addition, the
139. Moore v. Armstrong, 149 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1963); Varholy v. Sweat, 15 So.
2d 267 (Fla. 1943); In re Holland, 356 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
140. State v. Snow, 324 S.W.2d 532 (Ark. 1959).
141. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
142. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
143. National Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
144. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).
145. von Raab, 489 U.S. at 615.
146. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (holding that inmates, follow-
ing a visit from friends and relatives, could be both strip and body-cavity
searched). But see Stewart v. Lubbock County, Tex., 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir.
1985) (county's policy of permitting any arrested individual, including minor
offenders, to be strip searched was an unconstitutional violation of Fourth
Amendment rights), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1066 (1986); Giles v. Ackerman, 746
F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984) (a person arrested for a minor offense may be sub-
jected to a strip search only if officials have a reasonable suspicion that he is
carrying contraband), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Mary Beth G. v. City
of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983) (strip search of misdemeanor offend-
ers who posed no danger was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
The Ninth Circuit has rejected due process challenges to highly intrusive
searches for contraband hidden in body cavities and to forced physical treat-
ment to recover swallowed contraband in contexts where these actions were
undertaken without coercion, violence, or brutality to the person. Blefare v.
United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) (rejecting "outrageous conduct"
challenge to insertion of tube into defendant's stomach to force him to vomit
swallowed drug capsules when pain was limited and procedure was performed
by licensed physician).
147. Some courts have upheld intrusive body cavity searches, particularly
at the border and within prisons. United States v. Handy, 788 F.2d 1419 (9th
Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1979)
(discussing the three standards for border searches: no suspicion for question-
ing and luggage searches; real suspicion for strip searches; clear indication for
body cavity searches).
148. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d at 556.
149. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
150. See Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (notwithstanding the
right to refuse psychotropic medication, these drugs may be given to an invol-
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state may administer powerful drugs to prisoners against their
wills to maintain prison discipline and order.151 Moreover, the
state may compel a criminal defendant who is incompetent to
stand trial to take drugs solely for the purpose of rendering her
competent.152 Courts have also held, notwithstanding the clas-
sic case of Rochin v. California,153 that federal authorities may
subject a person to a stomach-pump type of procedure, or re-
quire him to ingest emetics, in order to bring about regurgita-
tion of evidence.1M The state will not release from a mental
hospital a person who refuses to take medication if there is a
risk that the person will behave dangerously without the
drugs.155 Lastly, courts have denied parental rights to a parent
who has refused to take prescribed medication.156
untarily committed patient whenever, "in the exercise of professional judg-
ment, such an action is deemed necessary to prevent the patient from
endangering himself or others"); see also In re Guardianship of Roe, 421
N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (dangerous
or potentially disruptive mental patients may be given psychoactive drugs
against their wills).
In many cases, psychiatric inmates who have a theoretical right to refuse
treatment find this right inapplicable if they would be dangerous to others
without treatment. The drugs used in treatment may cause serious and ex-
tremely distressing movement and neurological disorders as side effects, and
may also cause a very serious long term disorder, tardive dyskinesia, in 20% to
50% of patients. See Jessica Litman, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible
Medication of the Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1720, 1726
(1982). Many patients also consider the overall feeling and effect of these
drugs extremely unpleasant.
In Rogers v. Commissioner, 458 N.E.2d 308, 311 (Mass. 1983), the court
held that, although a patient has the right to refuse treatment, this right may
be overridden in an emergency. The court found that a patient could be
treated against his will if treatment would avoid "immediate, substantial, and
irreversible deterioration of a serious mental illness." 1d. (quoting MASS. GEN.
L. ch. 123, § 21 (1986)).
151. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 243 (1990) (Stevens, J., joined by
Brennan, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the major-
ity's opinion that the prison policy at issue allowed forced administration of
psychotropic drugs only if administration of those drugs would benefit the in-
mate's medical condition).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
444 U.S. 847 (1979); State v. Otero, 570 A.2d 503 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1989); People v. Parsons, 371 N.Y.S.2d 840 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975).
153. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcible extraction of evidence from a suspect with
a stomach pump violates due process).
154. See Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
155. In re Lowell J. Malm, 375 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
156. In re The S Children, 540 N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div. 1989); State ex rel
Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v. Campbell, 496 P.2d 249 (Or. Ct. App.
1972).
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G. RELEVANCE OF MATERNAL HEALTH RISKS
Opponents of compelled cesarean sections, noting the medi-
cal risks which accompany the procedure, point to the Supreme
Court's holding in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists.5 7 Thornburgh struck down a regula-
tion which required that "'[t]he abortion technique employed
shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for the
unborn child to be born alive unless'... that technique 'would
present a significantly greater medical risk to the life or health
of the pregnant woman.' "158 The Court found the language in-
valid because it would require a pregnant woman to bear a
greater medical risk to save the life of the viable fetus. 159 Os-
tensibly relying on an earlier decision, Colautti v. Franklin, it
discussed the "undesirability of any 'trade-off' between the wo-
man's health and additional points of fetal survival."'
60
This discussion was in the abortion context, and abortion,
as of this writing, is a highly protected constitutional right.
Abortion can be denied only in exceptional circumstances. In
the third trimester, however, the state may prohibit abortion
after the point of fetal viability except if an abortion is neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the mother.16 Those who
oppose court ordered cesareans argue that they pose a risk to
157. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (5-4 decision).
158. Id at 768 (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 768-69.
160. Id at 769 (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979), which
declared, but did not hold, that a trade-off would create "serious ethical and
constitutional difficulties").
Yet, as Justice White observed in dissent in Thornburgh, Roe, by allowing
the state to forbid all post-viability abortions except when necessary
to protect the life or health of the pregnant woman ... involves a
trade-off between maternal health and protection of the fetus, for it
plainly permits the state to forbid a post-viability abortion even where
such an abortion may be statistically safer than carrying the preg-
nancy to term, provided that the abortion is not medically necessary
.... Surely it cannot be argued that any abortion that is safer than
delivery is medically necessary, since under such a definition an abor-
tion would be medically necessary in all pregnancies.
Id- at 808-09. Similarly, one commentator has observed that legal abortions
have a lower maternal mortality rate than childbirth. This is so even for abor-
tions performed later than 21 weeks of gestation, although risk to the mother
from abortion increases as gestation progresses beyond the 21st week. Alice
M. Noble-Allgire, Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections: A Judicial Standard for
Resolving the Conflict Between Fetal Interest and Maternal Rights, 10 J.
LEGAL MED. 211, 238 (1989).
161. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). This is not to say that the
state's right to prohibit an abortion in the third trimester necessarily implies
the right to require cesarean surgery. What Roe does say is that the state's in-
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the mother's health.162 The health argument takes a concept
used in one very unique and distinctive area of the law-abor-
tion rights---and applies it to a situation not contemplated by
the Court.163 An abortion requires consultation between the
patient and her physician, as well as concurrence of the physi-
cian in the decision to terminate a pregnancy. An abortion is
usually done because the mother does not want a child. With
respect to legal abortions, the law is unconcerned with preserv-
ing the life or health of the fetus. When a woman chooses to
have a cesarean, however, she has usually done so to save her
child.'6
In any event, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
165
cast great doubt on the continued vitality of Roe as well as the
Thornburgh interpretation. A plurality of the Webster Court
upheld the constitutionality of a portion of the statute at issue,
which it construed as requiring a physician to use reasonable
professional judgment in determining fetal viability if the fetus
was suspected to be at or beyond twenty weeks gestation.
166
The statute created what is essentially a rebuttable presump-
tion of viability at twenty weeks, which the physician is re-
quired to rebut with tests-including, if feasible, those for
gestational age, fetal weight, and lung capacity-indicating that
the fetus is not viable.167 In upholding the statute, the plurality
construed it to require physicians to adhere to professional
standards of care in determining when and whether to conduct
the tests for viability.
168
Webster seems to overrule Colautti by disapproving of
Roe's "rigid" trimester tests and by its willingness to tolerate
regulations concerning viability and protection of the fetus.
terest in the potential life of the fetus in the third trimester is "compelling"
absent the necessity of preserving the mother's life or health. Id at 163-65.
162. See, e.g., Nelson & Milliken, supra note 2, at 1064-65.
163. Roe stated that the state could prohibit a third trimester abortion "ex-
cept where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preserva-
tion of the life or health of the mother." 410 U.S. at 165. So, whether the
fetus-destroying behavior, an abortion or a non-cesarean, is necessary for the
health or life of the mother is a matter of "appropriate medical judgment."
When a cesarean poses only the normal and usual risks, a doctor can appropri-
ately, i.e. non-negligently, conclude that a cesarean would not significantly en-
danger the life or health of the mother.
164. But see infra note 204 (discussing women who refused cesarean sur-
gery evidently in order to avoid having "inconvenient" children).
165. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
166. Id at 513-20 (plurality opinion).
167. Id at 500-01.
168. Id. at 512-14.
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Although protection of maternal health was not emphasized in
Webster, the case permits viability testing even though some
tests could endanger the mother. This means'that the protec-
tion of fetal well-being could be considered to outweigh the in-
terest in maternal health if a physician believes tests are
needed. In Webster there was evidence that some of the medi-
cal tests at or around twenty weeks might harm the woman's
health.169 Webster, then, demonstrated the Supreme Court's
willingness to uphold legislation that created some risk to the
mother's health for the sake of the fetus. As construed by the
plurality, a physician is free to balance maternal health risks
against risks to the fetus in accord with the physician's profes-
sional judgment.
In light of both Webster and the retirement of Justices
Brennan and Marshall, it is appropriate to recall the minority
view of the issue in Thornburgh. As Justice White noted in dis-
sent: "I find the majority's unwillingness to tolerate the impo-
sition of any nonnegligible risk of injury to a pregnant woman
in order to protect the life of her viable fetus in the course of
an abortion baffling."' 70
Finally, even if Thornburgh's "no trade-off" language con-
trols and applies in a non-abortion situation, it would not pro-
hibit a compelled cesarean where such surgery advances the
mother's health interests as well as the state's interest in the
live birth of a fetus. As will be discussed below, both the
health of the mother and her fetus are endangered absent
cesarean surgery in several obstetrical scenarios. 17'
It has also been argued that, in order to invade the bodily
integrity of a woman for the sake of the fetus, the state must
169. The lower court in Webster found that "amniocentesis imposes addi-
tional significant health risks for ...the pregnant woman." Reproductive
Health Servs. v. Webster, 662 F. Supp. 407, 422 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The
Supreme Court plurality read the statute as requiring that a physician use his
or her professional skill and judgment in determining whether to test for via-
bility at the 20th week, even though some of the tests might increase the risk
to the mother's health, and even though some of those tests might in fact be
performed on a non-viable fetus. There were four votes for overruling Roe.
Justice O'Connor would apply an "undue burden" test to determine whether a
given regulation was an undue burden on the right to an abortion, and she in-
vited new state regulations to be brought to the Court for consideration. 492
U.S. at 530-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 809 (1986) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Chervenak & McCullough, supra note 120, at 13 (discussing
complete placenta previa).
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demonstrate a compelling interest and must implement the law
in the least intrusive manner possible. 172 This Article argues
that in situations where vaginal childbirth would seriously en-
danger the fetus,173 a cesarean is the least intrusive and most
narrowly tailored means that will accomplish the compelling
objective of saving the life of the viable, verge-of-birth fetus.
III. BALANCING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
CESAREAN SURGERY
In some circumstances fetuses, especially viable fetuses,
have legal rights.'7 4 Further, because a cesarean involves a
verge-of-birth fetus, one can reasonably argue that this fetus
should have the rights of a born person under the duty to res-
cue, the duty not to prevent rescue, and the medical neglect
and justification doctrines.175
Although there is, then, a substantial case to be made for a
maternal duty to undergo a cesarean if necessary to save the
life of the verge-of-birth fetus, the argument is admittedly
somewhat less than compelling. The relevant case law leaves
us short of a doctrine that all women must take the risks of a
cesarean in order to save the life of a fetus. There are legiti-
mate ways of distinguishing and reading less broadly the prece-
deritial lines I have discussed. For example, although there is a
duty to rescue in some situations, courts have not determined
how great a risk one must take to satisfy that duty. And
although there are many legitimate invasions of bodily integ-
rity, the Supreme Court's tone, if not holding, in Winston v.
Lee surely disapproved of compulsory surgery barring unusual
circumstances. 176 Although the Supreme Court has held that
the state may have a compelling interest in the life of a viable
fetus, it has also held that a state could not prohibit a third tri-
mester abortion if doing so would endanger the life or health of
the mother.177 Moreover, the generally permissible prohibition
of a third trimester abortion is not the equivalent of the man-
dating of cesarean childbirth. While some cases recognize
172. See Johnsen, supra note 88, at 619.
173. See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 707 n.12, 707-08 n.16, 708 n.21 (indi-
cating some of the conditions as to which there is high rate of fetal mortality
absent a cesarean).
174. See supra part II.A.
175. See supra parts II.D. and II.E.
176. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
177. The early cases interpreting health were very broad indeed. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
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rights of a fetus against its mother, 78 they are few and far be-
tween. They may show that a mother has legal duties to her
fetus, but they do not answer the question of how far such du-
ties extend. While some state trial courts have upheld criminal
and civil actions which amount to a charge of fetal abuse, 79
there have been only a handful of inconsistent appellate hold-
ings on the subject.'80 That a state may not apply the terms of
a living will to a pregnant woman, in short, that she may not
refuse life-extending treatment, does not necessarily imply that
she must submit to a cesarean against her wishes. Finally, the
medical neglect cases, other than the transfusion cases, do not
involve bodily invasions of parents, or protection of fetuses.
The basic argument against compelling a pregnant woman
to submit to cesarean surgery to save a fetus may be summa-
rized as follows:
A woman has a right to privacy and/or a liberty interest which
includes the right to refuse treatment. To overcome this right, the
state must have a compelling interest. The right to privacy includes
the right to personal autonomy, particularly regarding decisions over
what may be done to one's own body.' 81 The state may not coerce a
person into sacrificing bodily integrity either to benefit society at
178. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga.
1981) (per curiam).
179. See supra notes 45-49, 58-61 and accompanying text for a general
discussion.
180. E.g., Johnson v. Florida, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (up-
holding a woman's conviction for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor
because she ingested cocaine during her pregnancy); People v. Hardy, 469
N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an indictment charging the
defendant with delivering a controlled substance to a minor should be quashed
on the grounds that the legislature did not enact the statute to prosecute
mothers for the transfer of cocaine metabolites from them to their infants via
the umbilical cord), appeal denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991); In re Stefanel
Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that allegations that
a child tested positive for cocaine at birth, that his mother admitted using
drugs during her pregnancy, and that the mother was not enrolled in a drug
rehabilitation program are sufficient to state a cause of action for neglect), ap-
peal dismissed as moot sub nom. In re Sebastian M., 565 N.E.2d 1267 (N.Y.
1990); In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Faro. Ct. 1990) (birth of
child with positive toxicology for cocaine, symptoms of drug withdrawal, and
low birth weight, to drug abusing parent established neglect); State v. Gray,
No. L-89-239, 1990 WL 125695, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (dismissing an indict-
ment for child endangerment brought against a woman who used cocaine dur-
ing her pregnancy, and stating that "to commit the offense of child
endangering, the offender must be a person having custody or control of a
child, 'which presupposes the existence of a living child susceptible' to custody
or control").
181. See generally Gallagher, supra note 2, at 18-21 (discussing the woman's
right to self determination and bodily integrity).
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large or any individual. The state may not abrogate the privacy right
to benefit a fetus since it may not invade the right to benefit a born
person. 1 8 2 A person is entitled to make decisions regarding reproduc-
tion based on her own judgment and values.1 83 It is inappropriate for
the state or the judiciary to balance the rights of, or state's interest in,
a fetus against the rights of the mother. The fetus does not have
rights that can trump the right of the mother to be immune from in-
vasions of bodily integrity. Whatever the ultimate outcome of the
abortion debate, this particular decision does not implicate any affirm-
ative right of a mother to abort a fetus; rather, it addresses the right
of a person to be free from compelled medical treatment.
The Supreme Court has looked with disfavor on compulsory sur-
gery. With the exception of cesarean sections, no court has required a
person to undergo major surgery for the sake of a third party. The
state may not prohibit even third trimester abortions if the prohibi-
tion jeopardizes maternal health or life.l 8 4 Cesarean surgery jeopar-
dizes maternal health and life. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held
that a state may not allow a "trade-off" between state interests in the
life of a fetus and degrees of risk to maternal health.1 8 5 In other
words, any risks to maternal health constitutionally outweigh any
dangers to a fetus.1 8 6 The duty to respect bodily integrity not only
protects against risks to one's health, but against dignitary injuries by
embarrassing, humiliating, or invasive intrusions.
When a pregnant woman is not conscious, the substituted judg-
ment test is the appropriate means of determining whether she would
choose to have the cesarean. What is inappropriate is to balance the
right of the fetus, or the state's interest in the fetus, against the rights
or interests of the mother.
1 8 7
Having considered the strengths and weaknesses of these
arguments, and of my own submissions, I reiterate that
although each component of my argument may be "distinguish-
able," the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. A number
of factors weigh in favor of compulsion, including the increas-
ing likelihood that Roe v. Wade will be altered; the fact that
Roe did find a compelling, albeit conditionally compelling, state
interest in the potential life of a viable fetus; the trend toward
wrongful birth actions and survivorship actions against tort-
feasors causing stillbirth; the treatment of late stage fetuses as
patients by the medical profession; the arguable identity of the
182. See id at 23-26 (discussing the well rooted judicial refusal to "physi-
cally subordinate one individual to another").
183. See id at 28-31 (discussing the right to privacy and its importance to a
pregnant woman).
184. See Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1989-94.
185. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
477 U.S. 747, 769 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Rhoden, supra
note 2, at 1994.
186. See Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1989-94.
187. See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 749-63.
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rights of late-stage, verge-of-birth fetuses with the rights of
born infants; the persuasive parallels to justification theories;
the multiple sources of duties to rescue, as well as a general
duty not to prevent rescue of an individual in peril; the permis-
sible invasions of bodily integrity in a wide variety of circum-
stances; the clear import of the treatment of pregnancy in
living will legislation; the close analogy of the blood transfusion
cases in light of the relatively low risks involved in the ordi-
nary cesarean section; and the fact that the alternative to com-
pulsion in many cases is the death or lifetime debilitation of a
virtually born human being.
However, a slippery slope argument makes me hesitate. If
we exercise compulsory jurisdiction over women in this situa-
tion, where will the process stop? Pregnancy itself might be-
come quasi-suspect, and pregnant women could be subjected to
an array of regulations and sanctions to protect their fetuses
from abusive behaviors. A pregnant woman could become a
sort of second-class citizen, unable to drink or smoke, or take
even prescription drugs without the "pregnancy police" one or
two steps behind her with some sort of legally coercive "rem-
edy" at hand. Even a specific diet and moderate exercise could
be made mandatory. Would we move ever closer to the kind of
society Margaret Atwood bitingly satirized in The Handmaid's
Tale?3' s Pregnancy is not a social disease or a medically or le-
gally suspect category.'8 9 Yet were all pregnant women denied
the right to refuse a cesarean, it would be a small step to give
the well-being of fetuses priority over their mothers' rights in a
variety of situations.L9° Placing burdens on a woman who is
188. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1985).
189. On the other hand, I cannot agree with the sexist implications in the
assertion that giving legal recognition, in some situations, to fetal rights (or in-
terests or welfare) over the rights of the mother is to treat the mother as no
more than a "fetal container." Contra George J. Annas, Pregnant Women as
Fetal Containers, HASTINGS CENTER REP., December 1986, at 13-14. For the
purposes of the welfare of the fetus she may indeed be treated as a holder of
the fetus, but in all other respects, and at the same time, she is treated as a
person in her own right. We all have different roles to play at different times
and in different circumstances, yet we are entitled to more respect than is
summed up by an inflammatory phrase describing our specific duties under
these circumstances.
190. The Supreme Court, in International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991), held that where a company barred fertile women from
jobs involving actual or potential exposure to lead levels that might endanger
fetuses, it violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1988). 111 S. Ct. at 1200, 1203, 1210. The Court found that there
was disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination. Id. at 1203.
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carrying a verge-of-birth fetus, however, does not necessarily
imply that any burdens may be placed on a pregnant woman at
an earlier stage of gestation.
Based on the above precedents and considerations, I con-
clude that there is a right to refuse cesarean surgery, but that it
is a circumscribed right. The state has an interest in the birth
of the viable fetus, but it is not always controlling. A mother
may refuse a cesarean section except in instances where the life
or vital health interests of the fetus are at stake and: I) the
cesarean promotes the woman's health or life, or II) there are
no unusual risks to the mother1 91 but she asserts her refusal
without what I will call decisional maturity 92 or for reasons
other than her bodily integrity. Of course, if the cesarean is es-
pecially risky to the mother she may refuse the procedure no
matter what effect that decision has on the fetus.
IV. CESAREAN SECTIONS
An understanding of the nature of a cesarean section, its
The Court said that the company's policy was not neutral because it did not
apply to male employees in the same way it applied to female employees de-
spite evidence that male exposure to lead affects the male reproductive sys-
tem. Id Neither the business necessity defense nor the defense of bona fide
occupational qualification were applicable; nor was the safety exception to the
failure to meet the latter requirement. Id at 1204-07.
This case has little bearing on the issue at hand. For one thing, the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act applies only to employment situations. For another,
the Equal Protection clause does not forbid classification on the basis of preg-
nancy, since those who are not pregnant are not "similarly-situated." Preg-
nancy discrimination has not been recognized as sex discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Finally, in
Johnson Controls any pre-birth protection afforded by the company's policies
was not limited to conceived fetuses, or viable fetuses, let alone verge-of-birth
fetuses.
Were pregnancy found to be a suspect category for equal protection pur-
poses, as is gender, the state would meet the test necessary to validate the dis-
criminatory action. See Mississippi Univ. for Women et al. v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982). Hogan provided that to uphold discriminatory action it must be
shown that "the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."' Id- at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
191. The Supreme Court has held that whatever the medical label placed
on a surgical procedure, the issue is one of law. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
763 (1985). It would follow that the realities of the procedure, as more or less
intrusive and dangerous, would supersede the medical labels, e.g., "major sur-
gery," attached to the procedure. Id at 764 n.8.
192. A mature refusal is one that is actually informed; voluntary; authen-
tic, i.e. congruent with the person's values and preferences; and based on a
concern for bodily integrity. See infra part V.C.2.
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indications, and its morbidity and mortality rates, is a necessary
prerequisite to the development of a legally; medically, and
ethically sound model for intervention.
A. CESAREAN SURGERIES
Cesarean surgery is an alternative to vaginal childbirth. In
general, doctors perform a cesarean "whenever it is believed
that further delay in delivery would seriously compromise the
fetus, the mother, or both, yet vaginal delivery is unlikely to be
accomplished safely."'193 The surgery involves making incisions
in the abdominal and uterine walls and then removing the in-
fant. During cesarean surgery the mother is under general, spi-
nal, or epidural anesthesia.194
There has been considerable concern and controversy over
whether the number of cesareans performed in this country is
excessive. 95 In 1970, only 5.5% of births occurred by cesarean;
in 1989 the percentage had jumped to 23.8%, almost one million
cesarean sections per year.196 The rate of cesarean sections in
the United States is one of the highest in the western world.197
Some evidence suggests that obstetricians perform an indeter-
minate number of cesareans because they fear malpractice suits
that may involve huge damages for devastating injuries. 98 Ob-
stetricians' biggest concern with malpractice suits for cesarean
193. CUNNINGHAm ET AL., supra note 98, at 441.
194. Id.
195. See RosEN & THOMAs, supra note 1, at ix-xiii; Brody, supra note 1, at
B5. Commentators have urged that fewer cesareans be performed. See Norma
I. Gavin et al., Cesarean Section in North Carolina: The Need for Review, 51
N.C. MED. J. 81 (1990) (study of cesarean section rates).
In January, 1989, after making an extensive compilation of cesarean statis-
tics, the Washington-based Public Citizen Health Research Group concluded
that the optimal rate of cesareans should be 12% of all births, approximately
half of the current rate. Linda R. Monroe, Affluent Women Twice as Likely
as Poor to Have Cesarean Births, L.A. TIMEs, July 27, 1989, § 1, at 3.
The indications for cesareans that are most controversial are previous
cesarean surgery, dystocia, and breech position. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL.,
supra note 98, at 441-42.
196. See Myers & Gleicher, supra note 114, at 200; Janet Bass, Number of
Cesarean Deliveries Leveling Off, UNITED PR INTERNATIONAL, July 11,
1991. The 1989 rate was slightly lower than the 1988 rate of 24.7%. See Selma
M. Taffel et al., Letter to the Editor, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 200 (1990).
197. In 1983, the rate of 20.3 cesareans per 100 births was the highest of the
19 industrialized countries. This rate increased over the next few years, but
has since leveled off. The rate of primary cesarean sections in 1988, 17.5%, was
essentially the same as it had been for the two previous years. Taffel et al.,
supra note 196, at 200.
198. See Brody, supra note 1, at B5.
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sections are the "suit[s] brought for failure to perform a
cesarean delivery which the patient argues was necessary and,
if performed, would have prevented the injury suffered [by the
infant]."' 9 9 Critics charge that doctors perform unnecessary
cesareans to increase profits because "[d]octors usually earn 20
to 40 percent more and hospitals may double their revenue
with a Cesarean birth."2°°
Women who refuse cesareans base their decisions on reli-
gious beliefs, 201 fear of stigmatization, fear of surgery,20 2 fear of
dying,20 3 disbelief of the medical diagnosis, and their desire not
to have the baby.20 4 Women may also refuse because of the un-
desirability of an abdominal scar, because of a pathological de-
nial of pregnancy (especially teenagers), 205 or because of
depression or other mental disability. There have been several
cases where, subsequent to the court order, the mother deliv-
ered vaginally, with neither mother nor child suffering unto-
ward effects.
20 6
B. MATERNAL MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY
The risks from cesarean sections are not considered to be
high; indeed, cesarean sections are now considered to be among
199. CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH, supra note 93, at 484.
200. Brody, supra note 1, at B5.
201. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459
(Ga. 1981) (per curiam); see Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1959.
202. See, e.g., Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 73, at 209.
203. See, e.g., Lieberman et al., supra note 2, at 516.
204. See Jurow & Paul, supra note 2, at 596. Jurow and Paul discuss a
mother who did not want the cesarean because she did not want the baby. She
said having no baby would solve her already complicated personal life. Id. at
597. Standing by and supporting her was a male friend with whom she had
been living, but who was not the father of the fetus. Id. Since she presented
at term, the woman, in effect, was asking for an illegal abortion. (The surgery
was performed without court ordered intervention and despite her refusal; no
force was necessary. Id.). See also Lieberman et al., supra note 2, at 516 (pa-
tient said that death of the fetus would solve her complicated personal
problems).
205. See, e.g., P. Finnegan et al., Denial of Pregnancy and Childbirth, 27
CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 672 (1982); K.K. Milstein & P.S. Milstein, Psychophysio-
logic Aspects of Denial in Pregnancy: Case Report, 44 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
189 (1983); Robert I. Slayton & Paul H. Soloff, Psychotic Denial of Third-Tri-
mester Pregnancy, 42 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 471 (1981); see also Ina Aronow,
Saving Programs for Teen-Age Girls, N.Y. TImES, Nov. 19, 1989, § 12WC, at 4;
Julie Loftus, She Suffers, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1990, at 26; Parental Consent
Laws on Abortion Hurt Teen-Agers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1989, at 22.
206. See Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1959-60.
[Vol. 76:239
HeinOnline  -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 276 1991-1992
CESAREAN SURGERY
the safest major operations performed in this country.20 7 Ro-
sen and Thomas, who have argued that too many cesareans are
performed in this country, nevertheless conclude that "cesare-
ans have become far less risky over the years and now pose a
very low mortality risk for mothers. '20 8 The risk of death at-
tributable to cesareans is not easily determined because of the
difficulty in separating the risks associated with the underlying
condition from those of the cesarean itself.20 9 Studies of the
mortality rate associated with cesarean sections have produced
widely varied results. Reports reveal maternal mortality rates
from zero to 277 deaths per 100,000 sections.2 1 0 A relatively re-
cent summary of studies on maternal mortality rates states that
"[t]he absolute risk from cesarean delivery alone was thought
to be 6 per 100,000 procedures."
21 '
The most common causes of post-operative morbidity are
infection, hemorrhage, and urinary tract injury.212 Not surpris-
ingly, the complication rate is higher among women who un-
dergo cesareans in emergency situations.
21 3
C. WHEN CESAREANS ARE INDICATED
The four most common situations in which doctors perform
cesareans are dystocia, breech, fetal distress, and repeat cesare-
ans.214 There are a number of additional medical situations
207. Robert E. Rogers, Complications at Cesarean Section, 15 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 673, 673 (1988).
208. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 9.
209. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 98, at 444; E. STEWART TAYLOR,
BEC'S OBSTETRICAL PRACTICE AND FETAL MEDICINE 551 (10th ed. 1976); J.R.
WILLSON & E.R. CARRINGTON, OBsTERICS AND GYNECOLOGY 489 (9th ed.
1991); Joseph M. Miller, Maternal and Neonatal Morbidity and Mortality in
Cesarean Section, 15 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 629, 629
(1988).
210. See Miller, supra note 209, at 629.
211. Id "The [maternal] death rate directly related to surgery was 5.8 per
100,000 cesarean sections between the years 1954 and 1985, a figure to be com-
pared with a death rate of 10.8 per 100,000 patients delivered vaginally. The
main causes of death appear to be sepsis and pulmonary embolism." Rogers,
supra note 207, at 673.
212. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 98, at 444.
213. "A prospective study of cesarean sections indicates that the risk of
surgical complications is 11.6%, but there are differences according to the indi-
cations: the surgical complication rate for emergency operations is 18.9% and
that for elective operations, 4.2%." Rogers, supra note 207, at 673.
214. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 98, at 442 tbl. 26-1. Dystocia is a term
used for a variety of conditions which cause difficulties in labor that cannot be
corrected, making vaginal delivery extremely difficult and dangerous, if not
impossible. See DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 415 (26th ed.
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where cesareans are indicated.215 For purposes of my suggested
guidelines, this Article will analyze only those circumstances in
which vaginal delivery would substantially endanger the life or
vital health interests of the fetus and cesarean section would
not. In some of these scenarios, the cesarean would benefit the
mother by preventing serious harm to her. In others, the
cesarean would involve the usual risks of surgery to the
mother, without any countervailing advantages to her. In yet
other situations, where the cesarean is necessary to preserve
the life or vital health interests of the fetus, the operation
would involve high risks of mortality or morbidity to the
mother. In the next section, this Article will analyze the legal
and ethical propriety of compelling cesarean surgery in each of
these three situations, stipulating, based on realistic medical
scenarios, that absent a cesarean the fetus would die or suffer
severe handicaps.
V. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR INTERVENTION
Any proposed solution216 must reflect the fact that,
1985) [hereinafter DORLAND'S]; WILLSON & CARRINGTON, supra note 209, at
486. A breech presentation is one in which the fetus is malpositioned such
that, depending on additional circumstances, cesarean surgery may be safer
than vaginal delivery. See DORLAND'S, supra, at 1065; WnSON & CAR-
RINGTON, supra note 209, at 486.
215. See TAYLOR, supra note 209, at 540 tbl. 41.1, where the following situa-
tions are listed as indications for primary cesarean section: cephalopelvic dis-
proportion (21.5%); uterine inertia (13.8%); excessive size of infant (3.5%);
pelvic tumor (1.2%); toxemia (10.2%); placenta previa (7.4%); premature sepa-
ration of placenta (7.2%); malpresentation of the infant (7.1%); diabetes
(4.8%); elderly primipara (4.5%); fetal distress (4.0%); prolapse of cord (2.3%);
poor obstetrical history (1.2%); previous vaginal plastic surgery (0.9%); miscel-
laneous (10.4%).
Cephalopelvic disproportion is a condition in which the infant's head is too
large for the pelvis of the mother. DORLAND'S, supra note 214, at 397. The
term uterine inertia describes sluggish uterine contractions during labor. Id.
at 663. Toxemia is a condition of metabolic disturbance, causing pregnant wo-
men to suffer high blood pressure, edema, proteinuria (protein in the urine),
and sometimes convulsions and coma. Id at 1063, 1379. Placenta previa is a
condition in which the placenta develops in the lower uterine segment, such
that it covers or adjoins the internal os (through which the baby must pass
during delivery). Id at 1023.
216. There have been several proposed models or tests. For example,
Chervenak and McCullough have proposed guidelines which would permit
cesarean surgery when "the risks [of treatment] to the fetus are minimal, the
potential benefit to the fetus is substantial, and the risks to the woman are
those she should reasonably accept on behalf of the fetus." Frank A.
Chervenak & Laurence B. McCullough, Perinatal Ethics: A Practical Analysis
of Obligations to Mother and Fetus, 66 OBsTETRIcs & GYNECOLOGY 442, 445
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whatever the courtroom proceeding involved, it is likely to be
ex parte. Although critics of involuntary cesareans have ob-
jected to ex parte proceedings,2 1 7 cesarean sections are not the
only procedures that courts have ordered on an ex parte basis
despite privacy concerns.2 1 8 Indeed, in emergency situations in-
volving danger to the patient or others, courts and legislatures
have approved administration of psychotropic drugs without
any hearing whatsoever.21 9
(1985). Mathieu has advocated a balancing test in which the relative weights
of the conflicting interests vary according to the point in pregnancy at which
they arise. Mathieu, supra note 5, at 51-52. Myers would create a presumption
against intervention and would require the state to use the least restrictive
means when intervention is necessary. Myers, supra note 60, at 68-69; see Peta
Hallisey, Comment, The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling Mother: A Standard
for Judicial Intervention, 14 PAC. L.J. 1065, 1069 (1983) (advocating guidelines
which clearly define the extent of maternal authority in refusing fetal ther-
apy); Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care,
67 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1066-67 (1981) (exploring the constitutional limits on state
regulation and intervention in prenatal care).
217. The American Medical Association (AMA) has recently taken a posi-
tion generally against court ordered cesareans. See Helen M. Cole, Legal Inter-
ventions During Pregnancy: Court Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal
Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA
2663 (1990) (Board of Trustees Report). Part of the AMA's rationale is its con-
ception of the comparative legal rights and interests of the woman and the fe-
tus. Another part of the rationale is concern over medical liability, and a third
part is that ex parte proceedings are unfair to the woman involved. The last
point is dealt with herein by the high qualitative and quantitative standards of
proof and the requirement that the standards be communicated in writing to
the magistrate or judge.
218. See United States v. Couch, 688 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1982) (ex parte order
for X-ray search of a suspect's digestive tract), cert denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982);
United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980) (ex parte order for a strip
and body cavity search); In re Melvin, 546 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1976) (ex parte order
that a suspect submit to fingerprinting and photographing); In re Rosahn, 551
F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding petitioner in contempt for failing to com-
ply with an ex parte court order directing her to provide a grand jury with
photographs, fingerprints, handwriting exemplars, and hair samples); In re
Anonymous, 549 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1989) (order for a blood test of the
defendant for the AIDS virus for possible use by the prosecution in a case
charging attempted murder by biting), aff'd, 559 N.E.2d 670 (N.Y. 1990).
219. See People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 963 (Colo. 1985) (medication may
be administered to a nonconsenting patient prior to a hearing in an emergency
that "poses an immediate and substantial threat to the life or safety of the pa-
tient or others"). The fact that violent mental patients may, in emergency sit-
uations, receive forced treatment does not suggest that an involuntary
cesarean may be performed in an emergency without any court hearing. Un-
like a violent mental patient, whose endangerment of others is never justified,
a pregnant woman is entitled, under the analysis herein, to endanger her fetus
by electing against a cesarean, if she is "decisionally mature."
Where long term, nonconsensual medication or civil commitment of a
mental patient is contemplated, courts are increasingly holding that the pa-
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Proceeding on the assumption that an ex parte hearing will
be possible and necessary, this Article offers guidelines for the
quality and quantity of proof at such hearings. When only doc-
tors or hospital officials appear before a judge or magistrate to
advocate a compelled cesarean section, they should bear the ini-
tial burden of establishing two factors by clear and convincing
evidence:220 that the fetus will die or suffer severe lifetime
handicaps unless there is surgical intervention,22 1 and that the
mother was warned of all the risks, alternatives, and material
attendant circumstances, including the dire risk to the fetus if
the surgery is not performed.
222
If the judge is satisfied that this burden has been met, she
shall hear and rule on additional submissions as follows:
Category I: If the court further finds the existence of a
substantial probability that the cesarean will be of significant
medical value to the life or health of the mother, it shall order
the mother to undergo the cesarean. Category II: If, however,
the court does not make such a finding, it shall determine (A)
whether a clear and convincing showing has been made that
the risks to the mother are no higher than the ordinary and
usual risks of a cesarean. If the court finds "A" then it shall
inquire further whether (B) there is a compelling basis for con-
cluding that the patient's decision is inauthentic, the product of
external pressures, without adequate understanding and aware-
ness, or being made for reasons other than bodily integrity. If
it does not find "B" the court may not order the surgery, as the
decision is mature. If it finds "A" and "B" the court shall re-
quire proof that (C) no reasonable probability exists that the
patient is suffering from pathological levels of anxiety or panic
tient has a right to a full adversarial hearing before the proposed action may
be taken. See, e.g., id. (discussing administration of antipsychotic medication).
220. Clear and convincing evidence is that which persuades the trier of fact
"that the truth of the contention is highly probable, as opposed to more likely
than not." Disner v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 726 F.2d 1106, 1111 (6th Cir.
1984). It is evidence which produces a firm belief or conviction as to the mat-
ter to be proved. Trans-World Manufacturing Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc.,
750 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
221. That there are obstetrical situations where this standard can be met is
well demonstrated in Chervenak & McCullough, supra note 120, at 13-16.
222. The information shall include, but not be limited to, all non-trivial
risks, such as the risks to the mother of death or complications from the sur-
gery itself; the pain, distress, discomfort and duration of the recuperative pe-
riod; the risks to the fetus from an attempt at vaginal delivery; probable
benefits, dangers or adverse consequences to the fetus from cesarean delivery;
the hospitals' and physicians' success and failure rates with cesarean surgery;
and any other information of similar import.
[Vol. 76:239
HeinOnline  -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 280 1991-1992
CESAREAN SURGERY
such that compelling surgery would be inhumane. If it finds II
"A," "B," and "C," the court shall order the mother to undergo
the cesarean surgery.22 3 Category III: If the court finds that
the mother's risks are unusual, it shall not order a cesarean. In
this situation the surgery may take place only with the
mother's informed consent. The petitioning party shall append
a copy of these rules to the petition.22
A. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE NECESSITY FOR
A CESAREAN
This evidentiary standard will exclude the numerous situa-
tions in which obstetricians may reasonably disagree about
whether a cesarean is warranted. Thus, courts must follow the
dictates of the mother absent an abiding conviction of the high
risk225 of fetal death or severe impairment.
226
This Article's proposal posits a situation in which the fetus
will die or suffer serious lifetime handicaps unless delivered by
cesarean. Any arguable ambiguity about the necessity of a
cesarean to save the fetus removes all justification for perform-
ing the cesarean against the mother's will.2 27 Further, if doc-
tors perform the cesarean without her consent, there must be a
very strong reason; a necessary but not sufficient reason is that
the fetus's life or vital health interests would be severely jeop-
223. Under Category Two, cesarean surgery may be compelled if gyneco-
logical surgery under general anesthesia would be necessary in any event be-
cause the fetus would expire in the womb and not be extractable otherwise.
224. Given the rarity of this sort of case, the need for expedited judicial ac-
tion, and the fact that the patient will, by hypothesis, not be represented at an
ex parte proceeding, this requirement seems appropriate.
225. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (test for clear and
convincing evidence).
226. Many breech presentations are subject to debate as to whether a
cesarean is necessary. See ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 37-38. Fetal dis-
tress is also a debatable category in many situations. See id at 30-31, 34. A
previous cesarean is not necessarily an indication for a repeat cesarean. See id
at 40. Dystocia is a problematic diagnosis, and may result in unnecessary
cesareans if made unjustifiably. See id at 30. If justified, however, a cesarean
is indicated. Id.
A cesarean is always necessary in situations of complete placenta previa,
but less certainly necessary in situations of partial placenta previa. Id. at 49.
A cesarean is almost always necessary when there is a placental abruption,
since the fetus has been detached from its source of nourishment and would
die unless delivered. See ici at 31.
227. There have been at least two situations where physicians expressed
the view that vaginal delivery was too dangerous to the mother or the fetus,
but the mother nevertheless vaginally delivered a healthy baby with no detri-
mental effects to herself. See Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1959-60.
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ardized without a cesarean. The requirement of clear and con-
vincing evidence is designed to control the well-documented
tendency of obstetricians to recommend cesareans in situations
where the procedure is not clearly indicated, either because the
diagnosis is uncertain or medical authority is not strongly sup-
portive.228 It should also limit any tendency to overemphasize
cesareans for minority, poor, or non-English-speaking women.
B. CATEGORY ONE: PREVENTING SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO
MOTHER AND FETUS
In a Category One situation, where a cesarean section
would prevent substantial harm to the mother and prevent
death, major deformities, disabilities, or disease of the child, the
law is justified in ordering a mother to submit to the surgery.
Clinical examples of a Category One situation include: fetal
distress with placental abruption, complete placenta previa, and
gross cephalopelvic disproportion.229
In these examples, the life or essential health of the fetus
and the mother are both at stake; both will be seriously jeop-
ardized absent a cesarean section. The claim to autonomy, al-
ready weakened by strong arguments on behalf of a maternal
obligation to the verge-of-birth fetus, is substantially lessened
here. The refusal to undergo a cesarean under these circum-
stances appears to be not only harmful to a third party but self-
harming as well. In that sense, the decision is irrational. 230
Normally even an irrational decision of a competent pa-
tient to refuse treatment is not a legal basis for paternalistic in-
228. Cf. Chervenak & McCullough, supra note 120, at 13-16.
Those who plead uncertainty make a fundamental mistake. They
hold clinical prognostic judgment to a standard of truth that it can
never satisfy, namely, that it never turns out to be false in an individ-
ual case. On such a standard of truth, before the outcome actually oc-
curs, all clinical prognostic judgments must be judged possibly false
and therefore disabled by uncertainty. In effect, [those who claim
that there is inherent uncertainty of diagnosis and that this militates
against compulsory cesareans, propose] an impossible epistemological
standard, one that bears little relation to a reasonable test of episte-
mological reliability of clinical prognostic judgments. This test em-
phasizes the reliability with which such judgments are formed
because, prospectively, knowledge of the actual outcome is
unavailable.
I& at 13.
229. Elkins et al., supra note 2, at 152.
230. In using the term irrational, I am utilizing the definition and analysis
of Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert in their work PHILOSOPHY IN
MEDICINE: CONCEPTUAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE AND PSYCHIATRY
(1982). The attractiveness of the Culver and Gert thesis is that they do not
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tervention.231 Ordinarily, beneficence of a physician may not
take precedence over the patient's right of medical self-deter-
mination. The patient has a right to decide, and to decide on
the basis of information conveyed by her physician, whether or
not she will undergo recommended treatment. After all, it is
the patient's body that will be subject to the medical procedure.
But these are close questions. A patient's right to determine
her treatment is balanced against the state's interest in
preventing suicide and preserving life.
In this case, however, the patient's right must be weighed
against an additional factor: the harm to a viable, verge-of-
birth fetus who has acquired many of the rights provided to ba-
bies. Thus, because the irrationality will cause harm not only
to the patient herself but to a third party as well, this Article
asserts that the law is justified in intervening to save the two
lives.2 2 Since the right to harm oneself is not an absolute
posit that one need have a reason to act rationally;, they posit that one need
have an adequate reason to do harm to oneself. I& at 29.
An irrational decision is one that is self-harming and not based on a fu-
ture-oriented, adequate reason. For a reason to be "adequate," a weighing of
good and evil must result in a net good to the parties involved. When those
tests are not met, we can say that the decision is irrational. Id at 27-31.
The authors define self-harming as "causing (or not avoiding) some evil
for oneself. Evils or harms consist of the following conditions: death; pain
(physical or mental); disability (physical, cognitive, or volitional); and the loss
of freedom, opportunity, or pleasure." Id at 27.
Self-harm sought to be justified by present emotions or facts about the
past is always irrational according to Culver and Gert. Id at 29. They do not
hold that one need have a reason to act rationally. They contend, however,
that self-harming behavior without a reason rooted in the future is to act irra-
tionally. Id.
All this is not to say that Culver and Gert would intervene on a mere
showing of irrational conduct. For their definition of justifiable paternalism
(requiring as one element that the conduct be irrational) see id. at 143-163.
231. See, ag., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Mass. App. Ct.
1978) (holding that the irrational refusal of amputation is not equivalent to in-
competence, and thus surgery could not be performed against the patient's
will); In re Quakenbush, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County (N.J.) Ct. 1978) (up-
holding a patient's privacy right to refuse amputation of gangrenous leg); In re
Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623 (Northhampton County Ct. 1973) (honoring a
60-year-old patient's refusal of a breast biopsy for reasons that included delu-
sional fear of loss of child-bearing capacity and a chance for a movie career).
232. This would be so even if the mother in Category One met the tests in
Category Two, i.e., gave a competent, voluntary, personally authentic reason,
rooted in her concern with bodily integrity.
Note also that the concept of "irrationality" as used here has no place in
Category Two analysis. Rationality is a difficult concept to define, and I have
omitted it from the formulation for Categories Two and Three. The definition
I offered above, however, should serve to make it less ambiguous, and the con-
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 283 1991-1992
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
right, it hardly qualifies as a principle worthy of protection no
matter what the cost to others.
C. CATEGORY Two: PREVENTING SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO
FETUS WHEN MOTHER'S RISKS ARE NORMAL
In a Category Two situation, where a cesarean section
would prevent death or serious injury of the fetus and would
present only the usual risks to the mother, the court may be
justified in ordering a cesarean if the mother's decisional ma-
turity is in significant doubt. This category will also apply to
cases in which the mother is not conscious and cannot give her
informed consent. Clinical examples of a Category Two situa-
tion include: ruptured membrane with prolapse of umbilical
cord and fetal distress.23
3
In this category, the first step for determining whether to
override a mother's failure to consent to cesarean surgery is a
clear and convincing medical diagnosis that the fetus faces sub-
stantial risks of death or serious medical injury. If such a diag-
nosis is made, then a court may disregard the mother's failure
to consent, or her objections, only after undertaking an addi-
tional three-step analysis. It first must determine whether, the
mother's failure to consent is rooted in concerns about some-
thing other then bodily integrity, and then it must decide if. the
patient has exhibited decisional maturity. Finally, the court
must determine that requiring the mother to undergo the pro-
cedure will not set off such intense levels of fear that the sur-
gery would be inhumane.
1. Bodily Integrity Considerations
As long as the refusal is made with decisional maturity,
concern about bodily integrity, by itself, is a sufficient basis for
a woman to refuse a cesarean, even if the fetus faces substantial
risks and the mother faces the normal risks associated with the
procedure. Concern about bodily integrity may take many
forms. If, for example, the mother expresses fear of the sur-
gery because she is diabetic, her reason is rooted in an aspect of
bodily integrity. So is a Jehovah's Witness's refusal to have a
blood transfusion because she believes the blood will make her
body unclean.
cept seems unavoidably appropriate to a determination of the sense of any re-
fusal to undergo a cesarean that falls into Category One.
233. See Leiberman et al., supra note 2, at 515.
[Vol. 76:239
HeinOnline  -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 284 1991-1992
CESAREAN SURGERY
Some reasons do not comport with bodily integrity. If the
patient refuses to consent to the procedure because she does
not want to have the child, as has occurred in at least two
cases,2 she is not basing her concern on bodily integrity. In-
stead, she is asking for the equivalent of a third trimester abor-
tion, and doctors should not respect her wishes. Similarly, the
court should not view disagreement with the doctor's diagnosis
as a bodily integrity reason. The patient's limited autonomy
rights do not include the right to deny, at the expense of her
fetus, a diagnosis that has been established by clear and con-
vincing evidence.
2. The Requirement of Decisional Maturity
An informed, voluntary, and authentic choice deserves to
be heeded. These three decisional qualities, combined with a
reason for refusing based on bodily integrity, I refer to as "deci-
sional maturity." A woman as to whom there is no strong evi-
dence of incompetence or inauthenticity, and who refuses for
reasons of bodily integrity, has every right to have her refusal
honored. Why should decisional maturity suffice to allow a re-
fusal which results in the death of the fetus? A woman who is
exhibiting decisional maturity has given the matter some
thought, and is in touch with her deepest sense of self, is fully
aware of and unpressured by externalities, and rejects the sur-
gery for reasons associated with her bodily integrity. The rejec-
tion is a meaningful one, not frivolous or merely a reflection of
transient values or external pressures. It is the paradigm of an
autonomous choice by a competent person.
a. Voluntariness
The mother's decision to refuse the cesarean must be her
own free choice. It must not be based on external duress. For
example, the woman has not made a free decision if she is bow-
ing to pressure from her husband, lover, family, or members of
her religion. In other words, the situation must be such that
she could not say afterwards, having refused the surgery, that
she could not have done otherwise under the circumstances.
The decision must reflect her true choice, the consequence of
the operation of her unweighted internal scales, not the im-
posed demands, direct or indirect, of other people.
234. See supra note 204.
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 285 1991-1992
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
b. Authenticity
By the term "authenticity" I refer to the decisions and ac-
tions of the authentic self.235 These actions should be funda-
mentally faithful to the values, preferences and principles that
the person has held over the long run.235 The idea of authentic-
ity is an idea of true choice. The present views a patient voices
may not be her authentic choice. The court should determine
whether there is congruence between her present position and
her long run values and preferences.237 If the patient has vacil-
lated continuously, the fact that the last position she takes
before action is necessary to save the child is a position against
the surgery should not be conclusive evidence of her desires on
the subject. The question is one of authenticity. What is her
authentic view? Do the views she previously expressed include
the views she expressed since she learned that she was preg-
nant, the views expressed to her husband or other friends and
relatives? Has she taken steps to provide good prenatal care?
Has she been in a high risk pregnancy program? Has she asked
questions of, or made statements to, her physician or others in-
dicating that she was looking forward to having the child?
What feelings has she expressed about surgery in general and
cesarean surgery in particular?
For example, if the mother had consistently voiced a desire
to have a cesarean if necessary, and was fully informed about
what that would entail, but in the excitement or panic of the
moment changed her mind, a serious question would arise
about whether her change of mind reflected her authentic
235. The genesis of this concept in the present author's thinking was a tele-
vision special, Ethics in America: Does Doctor Know Best?', which aired on
PBS in February, 1989. On this program, Dr. Williard Gaylin, a psychiatrist,
ethicist, and then head of the Hastings Center used "authenticity" to mean
something like the more familiar "substituted judgment test" employed where
a once-competent patient is presently incompetent.
236. See Danny Scoccia, Paternalism and Respect for Autonomy, 100 ETH-
ics 318 (1990).
237. "Authenticity" goes by various other names in the literature of both
medicine and philosophy. For example, an article in the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine treats it as an aspect of rationality. Dan W. Brock & Steven
A. Wartman, When Competent Patients Make Irrational Choices, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1595, 1596 (1990).
For an additional discussion of "authenticity," see Bruce A. Miller, Auton-
omy and the Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug.
1981, at 24 (suggesting a multi-factorial test, which included analysis of con-
flicts between the factors for determining autonomy, i.e., determining whether
a decision is voluntary, intentional, authentic, and the product of knowledgea-
ble and rational deliberation and moral reflection).
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self. s A person certainly can change her mind. It is only
where there has been a previous well-integrated expression of
willingness to have a cesarean that a sudden shift would be sus-
pect. A single past assertion of willingness to have a cesarean
does not establish her authentic position. The prior expression
should be tested for its repetitive consistency, its depth of ex-
pression, its stated rationale, and its proximity to the present.
Although critics might argue that overruling a woman's ex-
pressed wishes on the ground that they are not "authentically"
hers is paternalistic, it is helpful to consider that a patient's
choice may be the result of varying levels of autonomy. For ex-
ample, because of exigencies such as pain, confusion, drugs,
stress, or excitement, a patient who is nonetheless "competent"
may be exercising a low level of autonomy when faced with a
treatment decision.
It is important to keep in mind that the overwhelming ma-
jority of women, when informed that a cesarean section is nec-
essary for the safe delivery of their baby, willingly undergo the
surgery. Nor should the reader gather the impression that
even those very few women who refuse to undergo an indicated
cesarean act out of whimsy. Religious reasons, unfamiliarity
with the language, clinical depression, or deep seated fear of
surgery are hardly whimsical bases for refusal.
If a patient has previously consistently and forcefully ex-
pressed a view contrary to her current view, she is arguably not
now being her true self. This is not a paternalistic claim to
know better than the patient what is for her own good. Rather,
the patient's own history, long-standing value system, behav-
ioral past, and expressed wishes tell us that she is not manifest-
ing her true self at this time. In other words, when the
traditional "substituted judgment" test would give a doctor a
high degree of confidence that the patient genuinely would
favor childbirth by the necessary cesarean section, that doctor,
or a court, is justified in overriding her apparent election, at
least where there is a strong state and life interest competing
with the patient's ostensible choice.2 9
238. Time permitting, the physician or judge need not rely on what she can
discern from the patient alone, but can speak to the patient's husband, lover,
relatives, friends, and other physicians the patient may have seen.
239. Cf Scoccia, supra note 236, at 318 (discussing when it is ethically per-
missible to interfere with another's irrational choice).
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c. Informed Refusal
This "informed refusal" requirement demands a manifesta-
tion of awareness and understanding of the critical facts. This
portion of the test does not require the woman to inform her-
self of the risks, options, and consequences, but merely insists
that she have an adequate degree of understanding after a phy-
sician has made a vigorous, good faith effort to inform her of
the circumstances.
Doctors must inform the mother of the risks and benefits
to her own medical interests from the cesarean, from an at-
tempt at vaginal delivery, and from doing nothing. Doctors
must also inform the mother of the risks to the fetus under all
three alternatives. She must fully understand both the diagno-
sis and the prognosis.
An informed refusal has been required where an incompe-
tent patient's family sought to have her artificial feeding termi-
nated,240 and where the survivors of a woman claimed that her
physician had committed a battery by placing her on a respira-
tor in an emergency.24l In the latter case the court found that
if the woman, while competent, had made an informed refusal
to be placed on a respirator, doing so when she became incom-
petent would be a battery even though an emergency normally
provides implied consent to such treatment.
242
Ordinarily, treatment requires informed consent. The law
does not, however, ordinarily hold that to refuse treatment a
person must be fully informed. But where the life of a third
party would be threatened by non-treatment, a woman whose
declination of treatment is to be respected must at least make
an informed decision to forego treatment. For in so doing, she
will initiate devastating consequences to the fetus.
240. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (stating
that "[a] decision to refuse treatment, when that decision will bring about
death, should be as informed as a decision to accept treatment"), qff'd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dep't., 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
241. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that "[b]efore [the] refusal can controvert the implied consent of a
medical emergency . .. it must satisfy the same standards of knowledge and
understanding required for informed consent").
242. See id. When a woman is mentally incompetent and facing an emer-
gency situation, and a cesarean presents the usual risks, she should be pre-
sumed to want delivery of her baby, even by cesarean if necessary. Such a
presumption is warranted by the facts that most women permit delivery of
their newborns; the fetus would die or suffer severe handicaps if a cesarean is
not performed; and a substituted judgment test is procedurally unrealistic at
this stage.
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If the patient is suffering from very high levels of anxiety
such that it would be inhumane to subject her to involuntary.
surgery, the law should recede. For in a decent society, the law
must never be an instrument of psychic terror.
d. Religious Objection
Should the law honor a religiously based refusal to un-
dergo a cesarean? Religious objections of patients to treatment
of themselves usually prevail, but often under circumstances
where the liberty right to refuse treatment would prevail in
any event.243 Parents' religious claims do not prevail against
the state's claim of medical necessity to preserve the lives of
children.2 " Earlier, this Article cited decisions holding that a
religious objection to a blood transfusion should not prevail
where the mother is pregnant and the transfusion is necessary
to save the life of the fetus as well as the mother.
245
Although religious claims alone do not warrant action or
inaction that jeopardizes the life of the child, religious claims
may form the basis of a mature refusal. The Jehovah's Witness
claim is based on bodily integrity grounds; it is likely to be au-
thentic; it is not involuntary merely because it is based on firm
religious views; and it may or may not be sufficiently informed,
depending on the circumstances. If the woman appreciates the
risks to her fetus from not having the surgery, as well as the
nature of the surgery and its risks, she can give an informed
refusal.
If a woman claiming a religious objection is being put
under duress by outsiders, perhaps threatening her with theo-
logical or cult-based sanctions if she has the surgery, she may
not be acting voluntarily. This is not to say that courts are free
to determine from her beliefs that she is not acting voluntarily.
If, however, there is manifest evidence of external pressure
on her to refuse the cesarean, her voluntariness may be
questioned.
In any event, one may question whether a court must rec-
ognize religious claims asserted to avoid general and neutral ob-
ligations. In Employment Division v. Smith,246 the Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment did not excuse a reli-
gious act from criminal punishment and, perhaps, general regu-
243. Cf. Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990).
244. See, e.g., In re Willman, 493 N.E.2d 1380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
245. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
246. 110 S. Ct. 872 (1990).
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latory laws requiring or forbidding certain conduct. Religious
beliefs do not constitutionally require any exemptions from
prohibitions or requirements of conduct, unless the action or in-
action is supported by some other constitutional provision.24 7
The Court declared that "a neutral, generally applicable regula-
tory law that compel[s] activity forbidden by an individual's
religion" is valid, whether or not the state can show a compel-
ling interest for overriding the religious belief.248 "[T]he right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' "249
Nothing in Smith precludes recognition of religiously based
claims. Precedent, however, strongly indicates that parents
may not interpose their religious beliefs in situations where
such beliefs will endanger their children.25 0 Consequently, reli-
gious beliefs alone should not be a basis for respecting an other-
wise less than fully mature decision to forego a cesarean,
thereby facilitating the death or severe lifetime impairment of
the virtually born fetus.
D. CATEGORY THREE: PROTECTING THE MOTHER FROM
SUBSTANTIAL RIsKS
In a Category Three situation, where the cesarean entails a
substantial risk to the mother's health, the surgery should be
performed only after the mother has given informed consent.
Clinical examples of a Category Three situation include: a
mother with a severe bleeding disorder, a mother with a family
history of unexplained death or paralysis from anesthesia, or a
mother who would be rendered sterile by the surgery.251 Addi-
tional examples include a mother with thrombocytopenia, or a
recent myocardial infarction or pulmonary condition that
would complicate the administration of general anesthesia,
which might be necessary in an emergency. 252
The law should not demand that a woman undergo unusu-
247. Id- at 1601.
248. Id,
249. Id- at 1600.
250. See In re Willman, 493 N.E.2d 1380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (parents were
not justified in refusing to provide chemotherapy or surgery for child with os-
teogenic sarcoma, even though parents were motivated by their religious
beliefs).
251. See Rhoden, supra note 2, at 2002.
252. See Nelson & Milliken, supra note 2, at 1064.
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ally risky surgery. The fetus, struggling for survival itself, is
not entitled to require the mother to take substantial risks of
serious harm without her consent. This is because the life of
the fetus is not yet equal in value to the life of the mother. It is
only a contingent, albeit viable, prospective being. The law may
demand that a parent do something to stop an assault on her
child, but it does not demand that she grapple with the assail-
ant herself.2 3 So the principle of "do no harm"-non-malefi-
cence-toward the patient, the mother, overrides the principle
of do no harm to the fetus, especially where the mother is also
asserting autonomy and bodily integrity. I would propose a
single exception to this rule: namely an exception for the situa-
tion in which death of the mother is imminent and the mother
is unconscious. In that situation the mother will not live to suf-
fer the complications and adverse consequences of the cesarean
surgery. The death itself will precede the projected harms
from the surgery. It would be unnecessarily tragic to permit
two deaths when one being could have been saved at questiona-
ble harm to the other.2
VI. IMPORTANCE OF A DIALOGUE
A dialogue about the possibility of a cesarean should begin
as soon as it is apparent that the patient is undergoing a high-
risk pregnancy.2 The law should encourage an ongoing dia-
logue between the patient and the physician designed to avoid
the ethical conflict at a time of crisis.
Realistically, this proposal places the burden on physicians
and affiliated personnel to consult with their pregnant patients
from the earliest time to discuss alternatives, risks, and options.
Doctors should particularly initiate this dialogue with a patient
who presents with a high risk pregnancy. The physician should
make clear the circumstances under which a cesarean might be
indicated for the patient's or fetus's benefit. The doctor should
253. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 56, at 377 (5th ed. 1984).
254. It could be argued that an involuntary cesarean on a woman who is
about to die deprives her of the right to die with dignity, in peace and quie-
tude. But suppose the dying mother gave birth vaginally? Not much peace
and solitude in that. Death would not be comfortable when the mother has
within her a viable, verge-of-birth fetus that she knows is about to die with
her.
255. See Chervenak and McCullough, supra note 216, at 442; see also Dena
S. Davis, Reflections on A.C., 2 BioLaw (University Publications of America)
Special Section, at S:448 (June, 1990).
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advise the patient of risks and complications. In addition, the
doctor should seek to discern the patient's preferences, both at
the beginning and over the course of the pregnancy. Some
writers suggest that if there is a real risk that a cesarean would
be necessary and the patient balks at that prospect, the doctor
and patient should discuss the subject of an abortion early in
the pregnancy.25 6 The physician should certainly inquire into
the reasons for refusing a cesarean, provide information if ap-
propriate, and continue the discussion until the patient's views
are well settled and quite clear. This should occur earlier in
the process of consultation, but the woman's views might not
become clear until the child approaches viability. What is im-
portant is that there be a dialogue between participants in the
birthing process.2
57
Chervenak and McCullough offer an excellent model of a
dialogue.258 The essential obligation of the physician is to con-
vey, in an understandable manner, the information the patient
needs for making an informed decision.
A number of medical writings urge maximum persuasive
efforts in late-term pregnancy.259 As long as neither threats
nor deception are employed, it is ethically acceptable for a phy-
sician "to try to persuade a pregnant woman refusing medically
indicated treatment to change her mind."260 Chervenak and
256. According to one writer, what justifies the compulsory cesarean is the
fact that the mother had options throughout the pregnancy to terminate it.
Kluge, supra note 112, at 209-10.
257. Failure of the physician to have these sorts of conversations with the
patient should be deemed legally culpable neglect.
258. Frank A. Chervenak & Lawrence B. McCullough, Clinical Guides to
Preventing Ethical Conflicts Between Pregnant Women and their Physicians,
162 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 303 (1990). The Chervenak-McCul-
lough model would begin with informed consent, continue with negotiations,
and conclude with respectful persuasion. Beyond the usual subjects that must
be disclosed to the patient, any matter that has a real potential for conflict
should be disclosed. The information "should be disclosed at a level and at a
pace appropriate to the intellectual capacity of the woman to understand it.
We caution against underestimating this capacity in pregnant women. For
non-English-speaking patients a competent translator should be provided at
this and late] ... stages of the informed consent process." Id. at 304. The doc-
tor must convey that "when the pregnancy is going to term the fetus is also a
patient." I&L at 305; see Davis, supra note 255, at S:450. The next step in the
process is negotiation toward consensus.
259. See Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 73, at 213; Lieberman et al., supra
note 2, at 517; Thomas L. Shriner, Maternal vs. Fetal Rights-A Clinical Di-
lemma, 53 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 518 (1979).
260. Nelson & Milliken, supra note 2, at 1061.
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McCullough offer a paradigm of "respectful persuasion. '26 1
They posit the possibility, however, that respectful persuasion
will not be effective.
2 62
It is my view that as long as the risks and benefits of a
cesarean, the comparative risks and benefits of vaginal delivery
and of doing nothing, as well as the experience of the hospital
and physician with cesarean sections are accurately portrayed
to the woman, the physician is entitled to convey to the mother,
in an appropriate manner, an opinion about what is in the
mother's best medical interests. Within the time frame al-
lowed, the physician should try to ascertain the patient's values,
preferences and beliefs, and tap into them to contend that they
support, if they do, acquiescence in cesarean surgery to prevent
the death or lifetime debilitation of the viable fetus. Persuasion
must be kept far short of the point of duress, coercion, undue
influence, deceit, or manipulation. The physician, in seeking to
persuade, must do nothing to undermine the patient's existing
competence, authenticity, and voluntariness.
Although courts once applied the prohibitions of the abor-
tion cases to efforts to persuade a woman to act in favor of the
life of the fetus,26 3 they may no longer be applicable in view of
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.264
261. Chervenak & McCullough, supra note 258, at 305-06.
262. Id
263. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986), the Court held that the state could not mandate delivery
of information to a woman contemplating an abortion, where such information
was designed "to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or
childbirth." Id at 760 (quoting Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983)). The state had asserted that the statute,
"describing the general subject matter relevant to informed consent" and stat-
ing "in general terms the information to be disclosed," was valid. Id.
The Thornburgh Court did not agree. It pointed out that one of the seven
types of information that had to be conveyed to the woman seeking an abor-
tion within 24 hours before consent is given was that there may be detrimental
effects from the abortion. Id. Thornburgh found that the informed consent
provisions in Akron were struck down for two reasons. First, "the information
required is designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade
her to withhold it." Id at 762 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 444). Second, "a
rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given... intrudes on
the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician." Id.
264. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The Webster plurality opinion suggests that
Thornburgh's invalidation of the informed consent provision of the ordinance
might no longer be followed, since it cites with approval Justice White's dis-
sent in Thornburgh on that point. Id. at 517. "As the dissenters in Thorn-
burgh pointed out, such a statute would have been sustained under any
traditional standard of judicial review, or for any other surgical procedure ex-
cept abortion." Id (citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION
In balancing between the life of a full term fetus and the
mother's right to respect for her bodily integrity and autonomy,
courts best resolve this dilemma by respecting the mother's
right to refuse a cesarean. Courts should require the mother to
submit to a cesarean only in the occasional case where the
mother would also suffer serious bodily harm absent a
cesarean, or where she lacks decisional maturity or concern re-
garding bodily integrity and the surgery would entail minimal
risks. Even in this last situation, a court should not order sur-
gery when the prospective mother is suffering from pathologi-
cally high levels of fear regarding the surgery. This Article
envisions resolving the competing interests of mother and fetus
at a hearing, albeit necessarily an ex parte hearing. The Article
would require the state (acting on behalf of the fetus) to satisfy
its evidentiary burden at numerous successive steps before a
court could order the performance of a cesarean on an unwill-
ing mother.
In an ideal world, societal education, discussion, and com-
munication would obviate the need for compelled cesareans.
However, this Article seeks to resolve the conflicting interests
of mother and fetus, and proposes a model that will provide
principled standards to guide judicial decision making.
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